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FINANCIAL INSTABILITY, TAX POLICY,
AND THE TAX EXPENDITURE CONCEPT
Tim Edgar*AS a public policy goal, moderation of financial instability has
gained considerable prominence in the face of the recent credit
contraction. Not surprisingly perhaps, the role of the tax system in
exacerbating instances of financial instability has begun to receive some
attention in the tax-policy literature. Consistent with the general thrust of
that literature, this article explores, in a very preliminary way, how some
selected tax-base rule choices line up with an explicit goal of ensuring that
the tax system supports regulatory and monetary policies intended to mod-
erate financial instability. The article frames the inquiry in terms of Hy-
man Minsky's "financial instability hypothesis" as an explanation of the
sources of financial instability. Minsky's work suggests how excessive lev-
erage and risk taking arise and can be seen as defensible targets informing
the choice of certain tax base rules, many of which are conventionally char-
acterized in the tax-policy literature as efficiency-reducing concessions to
revenue concerns. In this respect, the article draws on tax-expenditure
analysis to reconceptualize the possible design of some of these familiar
income base rules whose justification is altered somewhat when framed
against Minsky's explanation of the sources of financial instability.
More particularly, the article reviews the incomplete manner in which
dividend imputation systems commonly address a tax bias in favor of cor-
porate debt, and how this incompleteness can be justified as a means to
promote maintenance of margins of safety. The article also reviews the
case for and design of loss limitations, as applied to financial instruments,
as well as restrictions on the deduction of interest expense under the per-
sonal income tax as a form of loss limitation. No claim is made to defini-
tively resolve any of these base design issues; nor is there a complete
canvassing of all of the possible issues whose resolution is potentially af-
fected by a focus on financial instability. The purpose of the article is the
much more modest one of suggesting how standard analyses of interest
deductibility and the treatment of losses might be reframed with modera-
tion of financial instability as a public policy goal.
* Professor, Faculty of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto
and Faculty of Law, University of Sydney. An earlier version was presented at "Tax Ex-
penditures and Public Policy in Comparative Perspective" held in Toronto on September
11-12, 2009 and sponsored jointly by Osgoode Hall Law School and the Canadian Tax
Foundation. The author would like to thank Art Cockfield, Ed Kleinbard, Geoff Lloyd,
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is now somewhat trite to observe that the recent credit contraction is
the most significant financial crisis since the Great Depression of the
1930s. But this financial crisis is only the latest installment (albeit the
most severe) in a series occurring over the past twenty-five years,
including:'
* the savings and loan implosion in the United States;
* the stock market crash of 1987;
* the bursting of the Japanese real estate and stock market bubbles;
1. For a detailed historical account of financial crises, see generally CHARLES P. KIN-
DLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF Fi-
NANCIAL CRISES (John Wiley & Sons, 5th ed. 2005) (1978). See also CARMEN M.
REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME Is DIFFERENT: EirHT CENTURIES OF FI-
NANCIAL FOLLY 3 (2009).
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* the Nordic banking crises of the early 1990s;
* the Asian financial crisis;
* the bailout of the hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Management, in
the face of the financial market turmoil occasioned by the default of
the Russian government on its ruble-denominated debt; and
* the bursting of the technology share bubble.
The wild boom and bust swings characteristic of capital markets during
this relatively brief period appear to have provoked renewed interest in
the causes of asset price bubbleS2 and business cycles,3 with the latter
believed by many, until recently at least, to have been eliminated by con-
tinued growth supported by monetary policy focused on wage and con-
sumer price inflation. The contraction of the global credit system
triggered by the bursting of the housing bubble in the United States has
also highlighted what was already an emerging reexamination of the in-
tellectual framework of orthodox financial economics.4
The role of tax policy in all of this financial market mayhem is begin-
ning to attract some attention. For example, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) recently released a thoughtful and detailed paper exploring
the possible relationship between the tax system and financial instability.5
2. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 1 ("[B]y definition a bubble in-
volves a non-sustainable pattern of price changes or cash flows.").
3. See, e.g., Yair Listokin, Stabilizing the Economy Through the Income Tax Code,
123 TAX NOTES 1575, 1575 (2009) (noting renewed interest in the use of the tax system as a
policy instrument to stabilize the economy).
4. See, e.g., David Colander, Hans Follmer, Armin Haas, Michael Goldberg, Katarina
Juselius, Alan Kirman, Thomas Lux & Brigitte Sloth, The Financial Crisis and the Systemic
Failure of Academic Economics 1 (Kiel Inst. for the World Econ., Working Paper No.
1489, 2009), available at http://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/the-financial-
crisis-and-the-systemic-failure-of-academic-economics/KWP_1489_Colandereta/Financial
%20Crisis.pdf (criticizing the economics profession for the construction of theoretical
models based on unrealistic assumptions and for failing to communicate the limitations of
those models). But see J. Doyne Farmer & John Geanakoplos, The Virtues and Vices of
Equilibrium and the Future of Financial Economics, 14 COMPLEXITY 11, 11 (2008) (arguing
that equilibrium models can be useful, but they have limitations that require economists to
explore alternative approaches and directions). For a technical and mathematical account
of financial markets as dynamic systems, see JOSEPH L. MCCAULEY, DYNAMICS OF MAR-
KETS: THE NEW FINANCIAL EcoNoMics (2d ed. 2009).
5. See generally Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], Debt Bias and Other Distortions: Crisis-
Related Issues In Tax Policy (June 12, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/
eng/2009/061209.pdf [hereinafter IMF, Crisis-Related Issues]. The paper was preceded by a
brief note suggesting the various lines of inquiry that the IMF was pursuing. See generally
IMF, Tax Policy and the Crisis-First Thoughts (Feb. 2009), http://www.itdweb.org/
documents/FeatureArticle/IMFfeb_2009_full-article.pdf [hereinafter IMF, Tax Policy];
see also Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. [OECD], Comm. on Fiscal Affairs, Moving
Beyond the Crisis: Using Tax Policy to Support Financial Stability, at 1, CTPA/CFA/(2009)
32/ADD1 (June 12, 2009); Samuel T. Eddins, Tax Arbitrage Feedback Theory 1 (last re-
vised Aug. 18, 2009), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1356159; Thomas Hemmelgarn &
Gaetan Nicodeme, The 2008 Financial Crisis and Taxation Policy 2 (CESIFO Working Pa-
per No. 2932, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546973; Michael Keen, Alexan-
der Klemm & Victoria Perry, Tax and the Crisis, 31 FISCAL STUD. 43,43 (2010); Douglas A.
Shackelford, Daniel Shaviro & Joel B. Slemrod, Taxation and the Financial Sector 2 (May
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1601330; Daniel Shaviro, The 2008-09 Financial
Crisis: Implications for Income Tax Reform 2 (NYU Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Working
Paper No. 09-35, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442089; Joel Slemrod, Les-
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The IMF paper's principal points of emphasis are the well-known tax bias
in favor of corporate debt, as well as tax preferences for housing.6 There
is also some discussion of the possible effects of tax preferences for mana-
gerial compensation, loss limitations and risk taking, and tax-driven fi-
nancial innovation, particularly in the cross-border context.7 The IMF
paper emphasizes that, at the macro level, tax is probably of secondary
importance in any attempt to realize a rough balance between financial
stability and economic growth.8 This secondary role is suggested most
obviously by the fact that the tax biases identified as possibly contributing
to financial instability have been part of tax systems for some time and
probably cannot be seen as precipitating the latest crisis (or even the se-
ries of crises over the past twenty-five years). 9 Nonetheless, because of its
magnitude, this latest financial crisis brings into sharper focus the need
for tax rules that can be seen to support regulatory and monetary policy
in the sense that any behavioral responses do not exacerbate financial
instability.10 With this secondary role in mind, the IMF paper tentatively
supports measures that attempt to realize consistency of treatment along
certain behavioral margins." The suggestions tend to be broadly consis-
tent with familiar arguments for reform in the various areas highlighted in
the IMF paper. Indeed, these arguments are entirely independent of
maintenance of financial stability as a public policy goal.
This article similarly explores how some selected aspects of tax policy
line up with an explicit goal of ensuring that the tax system supports regu-
latory and monetary policies intended to moderate financial instability.
The article differs, however, from the IMF paper, as well as the other
limited literature on the same subject,12 in two respects. First, it frames
sons for Tax Policy in the Great Recession, 62 NAT'L TAX J. 387, 387 (2009). Two academic
workshops on the relationship between tax policy and the financial crisis have also been
held recently. See TAX POLICY AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Apr. 30, 2009) ECONPUB-
BLICA, Ctr. for Research on the Econ. of the Pub. Sector, Universita Commerciale Luigi
Bocconi, Milan, http://www.unibocconi.eu/wps/wcm/connect/Newstand+Events/Bocconi-
Events/Program-ofEvents/cv2009030089; RETHINKING THE TAXATION OF THE FINANCIAL
SECTOR IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECENT CRISIs (Feb. 5, 2010) NYU Sch. of Law, Office of
Tax Policy Research, Ross Sch. of Bus., Univ. of Mich., and Univ. of N.C. Tax Ctr., http://
www.bus.umich.edu/Conferencesffaxation-of-the-Financial-Sector.
6. IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 1.
7. See id. at 26-29.
8. See id. at 4.
9. See, e.g., Hemmelgarn & Nicodeme, supra note 5, at 2 ("While taxes have not
generated the crisis, some aspects of tax policy may have led to increased risk-taking and
indebtedness of banks, households and companies."); OECD, supra note 5, at 17 ("[T]axes
were not the root cause of the financial crisis, but tax rules for individuals and corporates
may have encouraged financial instability through encouraging risk-taking, risky credit and
corporate leverage, and through a lack of transparency facilitated by tax havens.");
Shaviro, supra note 5, at 3 (observing that any "causal relationship" between tax policy and
the recent credit crisis "remains unclear"). But see Martin A. Sullivan, Deleveraging the
Tax Code, 120 TAX NOTEs 1241, 1241 (2008) (emphasizing a close link between interest
deductibility for income tax purposes and levels of leverage).
10. Shaviro, supra note 5, at 22-23 (emphasizing the need for tax rules to avoid behav-
ioral responses that exacerbate the causes of financial crises).
11. See IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 33.
12. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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the inquiry explicitly in terms of a theoretical perspective that attempts to
explain the sources of financial instability. Second, the discussion draws
on the tax-expenditure concept and tax-expenditure analysis to reconcep-
tualize the design of some familiar income base rules whose justification
is altered somewhat when framed against this particular explanation of
the sources of financial instability.
Part II begins, therefore, with a brief description of Hyman Minsky's
financial instability hypothesis,13 which explains how excessive leverage
and risk taking arise. As the sources of financial instability, they can be
seen as defensible targets informing the choice of certain tax-base rules,
many of which are characterized in the tax-policy literature as efficiency-
reducing concessions to revenue concerns. Part III then attempts to ad-
vance this suggestion at a broad conceptual level by reviewing some fa-
miliar ground covered in the tax-expenditure literature. It is argued that
the tax-expenditure concept can usefully frame the assessment of various
tax rules as prone to excessive leverage and risk taking. Tax-expenditure
analysis can be invoked to supplement standard technical tax-policy anal-
yses of these provisions once they are framed in this much different
manner.
At a macro level, the tax-policy literature tends to highlight the use of a
progressive personal income tax and broad-based consumption taxes as
automatic stabilizers. Consistent with the IMF paper, Parts IV and V go
further and examine some fundamental tax-base rule choices with a view
to moderating financial instability. Part IV reviews the tax bias in favor
of corporate debt and, more particularly, how the incomplete manner in
which dividend imputation systems commonly address this bias can be
justified as a means to promote maintenance of margins of safety. Part V
examines the case for, and design of, loss limitations as applied to finan-
cial instruments, as well as restrictions on the deduction of interest ex-
pense under the personal income tax as a form of loss limitation. The
article makes no claim to resolve any of these particular base design is-
sues; its purpose is the much more modest one of suggesting, in a very
preliminary way, how standard analyses of interest deductibility and the
treatment of losses might be reframed with moderation of financial insta-
bility as a public policy goal.
Given this modest aim, the review of the income base design issues in
the last two parts is necessarily incomplete.14 Perhaps most importantly,
13. Minsky's financial instability hypothesis is articulated most completely in HYMAN
P. MINsKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (1986) [hereinafter MINSKY, STABILIZ-
ING (1986)]. With the first edition out of print, recent interest in Minsky's ideas led to
posthumous publication of a second edition under the guidance of Dimitri B. Papadimi-
triou and L. Randall Wray, two former colleagues of Minsky's at the Levy Economics
Institute. See generally HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (Mc-
Graw Hill Prof'l, 2d ed. 2008) (1986) [hereinafter MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008)]. Much of
the earlier development of the financial instability hypothesis is found in HYMAN P. MIN-
SKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES (1975).
14. For a more complete canvassing of the possible tax-policy issues whose resolution
is potentially affected by a focus on moderation of financial instability, see generally IMF,
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there is no discussion of issues unique to the financial sector.15 Parts IV
and V note only in passing how some of the rule choices applied on the
demand side of capital markets might be modified when applied on the
supply side-the financial services sector. There is similarly no discussion
of (i) the effect on risk taking of the provision of preferential tax rates for
managerial compensation;16 or (ii) the use of a transactions tax to moder-
ate financial instability.' 7 Adequate discussion of any of these subjects,
Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5; OECD, supra note 5; Hemmelgarn & Nicodeme, supra
note 5; Keen, Klemm & Perry, supra note 5; Shaviro, supra note 5. See also Martin A.
Sullivan, 10 Tax Changes to Prevent the Next Fiscal Crisis, 124 TAX NOTES 1295, 1295
(2009) (briefly describing a set of tax-reform measures intended to moderate financial
instability).
15. See, e.g., Shackelford, Shaviro & Slemrod, supra note 5, at 6-15 (discussing the
theory and design of corrective taxes as applied to the financial sector); see also Tobias
Adrian & Markus K. Brunnermeier, CoVAR (Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Staff Reports, No.
348, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1269446; Viral V. Acharya, Lasse H.
Pedersen, Thomas Philippon & Matthew Richardson, Regulating Systemic Risk, in RE-
STORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: How To REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 283 (Viral V. Acharya
& Matthew Richardson eds., 2009) (suggesting the use of a capital charge as a corrective
tax capturing the marginal contribution of individual financial institutions to system-wide
risk); Jaime Caruana, Gen. Manager, Bank for Int'l Settlements (BIS), The International
Policy Responses to Financial Crises: Making the Macroprudential Approach Operational,
Panel Remarks at Jackson Hole (Aug. 21-22, 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/
speeches/sp090911.htm. A "financial activities tax" levied on the sum of the profits of and
remuneration paid by, financial institutions, is suggested in IMF Staff, A FAIR AND SUB-
STANTIAL CONTRIBUTION BY THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, in IMF, FINANCIAL SECTOR TAXA-
TION: THE IMF's REPORT TO THE G-20 AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL 2, 19-34 (Stijn
Claessens, Michael Keen & Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, eds., forthcoming 2010) (on file with the
SMU Law Review), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/062710b.pdf. H.R
4173 IH proposes the adoption of a tax on wholesale liabilities of large financial institu-
tions as a means to recover some of the cost of the provision of liquidity and capital insur-
ance by the US government. See generally Lee A. Sheppard & Martin A. Sullivan, Taxing
Financial Pollution, 126 TAX NOTES 697 (2010).
16. See IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 29-31 (highlighting deferred taxa-
tion of executive stock options and capital gains treatment of the return to the carried
interests of fund managers as the two principal forms of tax-preferred managerial compen-
sation which may affect risk taking); see also Shaviro, supra note 5, at 20 (suggesting that
the tax system should disfavor "poorly-designed incentive arrangements"). But see Ridi-
ger Fahlenbrach & Rend M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis 25 (Fisher
Coll. of Bus., Charles A. Dice Ctr. for Research in Fin. Econ., Working Paper No. 2009-13,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439859 (finding (i) no evidence that alignment
of managerial incentives with the interests of shareholders resulted in better bank perform-
ance during the credit crisis and (ii) option compensation did not have an adverse impact
on performance). France and the United Kingdom recently adopted temporary taxes on
bonus payments to financial sector employees. See Shackelford, Shaviro & Slemrod, supra
note 5, at 17-18.
17. See, e.g., Adam H. Rosenzweig, Imperfect Financial Markets and the Hidden Costs
of a Modern Income Tax, 62 SMU L. REV. 239, 279-87 (2009) (proposing the application of
a transactions tax to derivative financial instruments to dampen increased counterparty
default risk in the presence of the scaling up of the bets associated with such instruments to
eliminate the effect of income taxation). There is a deep literature on the design of finan-
cial transaction taxes as a policy instrument to dampen excessive volatility in commodities
and securities markets. This literature is surveyed in Thornton Matheson, Taxing Financial
Transactions: Issues and Evidence, in IMF, supra note 15, at 144-187. See also Hemmel-
garn & Nicodeme, supra note 5, 15, 27-35 (concluding that the effects of a financial trans-
actions tax on asset price bubbles are ambiguous and preferring elimination of the
preferential treatment of debt as a more promising means to avoid excessive leverage and
risk taking).
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with moderation of financial instability as a policy goal, warrants separate
treatment. Finally, the subject of tax avoidance is largely ignored.18 The
unique issue in this area is the relationship, if any, between risk taking
and tax-avoidance activity. This also appears to be a subject that requires
separate treatment, primarily as an empirical inquiry.' 9 It is possible,
however, that the broad conceptual framework described in the article
can usefully frame the discussion of these other issues in much the same
way that it does the tax-base rule choices reviewed in Parts IV and V.
II. MINSKY'S FINANCIAL INSTABILITY HYPOTHESIS AND
THE MISMEASUREMENT OF RISK
Minsky's financial instability hypothesis emphasizes the role of lever-
age as the source of persistent financial instability in sophisticated market
economies. The instability may be exacerbated by the development of a
broad range of derivative financial instruments, as well as by fundamental
weaknesses of finance theory that have led to the mismeasurement of
risk. This broader economic framework highlights the significance of ex-
cessive risk-taking attributable to excessive leverage and the mismeasure-
ment of risk as sources of default risk and the associated systemic risk.
On the assumption of an optimal allocation of resources in the absence of
the change in price occasioned by the imposition of taxes, tax policymak-
ers have ignored these effects while focusing on micro-level incentives.
At a macro level, these incentives can exacerbate the effect of nontax
factors as causes of financial instability, with potential costs for the econ-
omy that are borne, in part, by innocent third parties. In this respect,
excessive leverage and risk taking, at a macro level, can be viewed as a
negative externality. 20
A. FINANCIAL STABILITY AS A PUBLIC POLICY GOAL AND LEVERAGE
AS A SOURCE OF FINANCIAL INSTABILITY
Because a focus on maintenance of financial stability as a public policy
goal would seem to require a working definition of the concept, it is per-
18. There is some limited discussion of tax planning along the debt-equity boundary
when interest and dividends are treated inconsistently for a range of investors. See infra
notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
19. IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 25-28 (noting the lack of understanding
of the effect of tax-driven financial innovation, including securitization, as well as the use
of low-tax jurisdictions in cross-border tax planning). The growing empirical literature on
corporate governance and tax sheltering would appear to suggest a weak link between tax
avoidance and risk taking. See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE
INCOME TAX 174-78 (2009) (briefly reviewing some of the relevant literature). But see
Eddins, supra note 5, at 19-20 (characterizing securitization and credit default swaps as
tax-driven transactions requiring the creation of low-quality mortgages with systemic risk
implications); Hemmelgarn & Nicodeme, supra note 5, at 26 (characterizing Eddins's tax
arbitrage feedback theory as "a seducing and rather convincing theory" that requires em-
pirical testing).
20. See IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 12 (characterizing excessive lever-
age as a negative externality that is not captured by micro-economic models focused on the
level of firm-specific borrowing as a function of the internalization of bankruptcy costs).
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haps surprising that this concept has not been articulated with any preci-
sion; like the corresponding concept of price stability, it may inevitably be
somewhat flexible. This characteristic is evident, for example, in one of
the more thorough attempts to define financial stability provided by Al-
len and Wood,21 who also canvass various policy instruments that can be
used to promote financial stability. They begin the definitional exercise
by noting that public policy interest in financial stability reflects an
awareness of the negative social and economic consequences associated
with an episode of financial instability. 22 They argue "that it is most use-
ful to think of financial stability . . . as a property of a system" much like
that in the physical sciences.23 A "financially stable" economy is said to
be "one that does not degenerate into instability when it experiences ...
an unexpected event, or shock,... or the unexpected failure of a substan-
tial company." 24 Allen and Wood then canvass possible characteristic
features of an episode of financial instability, which they define as: "epi-
sodes in which a large number of parties, whether they are households,
companies, or (individual) governments, experience financial crises which
are not warranted by their previous behavior, and where these crises col-
lectively have seriously adverse macro-economic effects." 25
For households, businesses, and governments, a financial crisis occurs
when access to funds is curtailed such that spending plans must be cur-
tailed.26 But financial instability at a micro level does not mean that an
economy experiences an episode of financial instability at a macro level. 2 7
At some admittedly ill-defined point, the extent of individual crises be-
comes so pervasive "that innocent bystanders get hurt."28 Moreover, as
Allen and Wood recognize, financial stability as a property of an econ-
omy is not "completely observable," because an episode of financial in-
stability can be latent and policymakers cannot be certain that the
economy will be able to dampen rather than amplify a shock that precipi-
tates a crisis.29 Given these circumstances, the best that policymakers can
do is to monitor "certain crucial features of an economy ... and to draw
inferences from such monitoring about the financial stability of the econ-
21. See William A. Allen & Geoffrey Wood, Defining and Achieving Financial Stabil-
ity, 2 J. FIN. STABILITY 152, 152 (2006) (noting the lack of a "widely accepted definition of
'financial stability"' and the lack of any associated consensus regarding the policies that
should be pursued to promote financial stability); see also Garry J. Schinasi, Defining Fi-
nancial Stability (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/04/187, 2004), available at http://www-bec.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wpO4/87.pdf.
22. Allen & Wood, supra note 21, at 154.
23. See id. at 155; see also Schinasi, supra note 21, at 8 ("A financial system is in a
range of stability whenever it is capable of facilitating (rather than impeding) the perform-
ance of an economy, and of dissipating financial imbalances that arise endogenously or as a
result of significant adverse or unanticipated events.").
24. Allen & Wood, supra note 21, at 155.
25. Id. at 160.
26. Id. at 159.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 159-60.
29. Id. at 155.
[Vol. 63976
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omy." 3 0 This necessary monitoring function is obviously performed most
effectively when policymakers have an adequate explanation of the
causes of episodes of financial instability. Despite lacking some of the
formal features of a model, Minsky's financial instability hypothesis can
be seen to serve this function. 3'
The intuition underlying Minsky's financial instability hypothesis is de-
ceptively simple in its description of the financing function. As Minsky
points out, his hypothesis is an interpretation of Keynes's classic work,
The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money,32 but with an
emphasis on the debt financing of investment, rather than fluctuations in
household demand and savings, as the principal source of instability. 33
At its core, the financial instability hypothesis is a theory of "the impact
of debt on system behavior and also incorporates the manner in which
debt is validated." 34 As a finance theory of investment, "the level of
profits" is "the key determinant of system behavior," since profits vali-
date debt.35
More particularly, Minsky illustrates how, at the macro level, aggregate
profits for each period equal aggregate investment and depend on aggre-
gate spending on investment.3 6 At a micro level, he argues that firms
must be able to realize a markup over labor costs and will pursue market
power to do so.37 Prices, therefore, have five discrete functions:
* to ensure that a surplus is generated;
* to ensure that some of the surplus accrues to business owners;
30. Id.
31. See GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES: CENTRAL BANKS,
CREDIT BUBBLES AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET FALLACY 158 (2008) (concluding that
policymakers should develop macroeconomic policy using the financial instability hypothe-
sis as the only model adequately explaining financial market behavior). But see Elisabetta
De Antoni, The (Too?) Optimistic 'Financial Keynesianism' of Hyman Minsky 23-24
(2005), available at http://www.ius.unicas.it/mc2005/papers/deantoni.pdf (noting some
weaknesses of the financial instability hypothesis and suggesting that Minsky seemed suffi-
ciently aware of them to label his analysis a hypothesis rather than a theory). Kindleberger
draws on Minsky's financial instability hypothesis to frame his historical account of finan-
cial crises. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 24-37.
32. Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis 1 (Jerome Levy Econ. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 74, 1992) [hereinafter Minsky, Instability] (discussing JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936)); see
also De Antoni, supra note 31, at 23-25 (contrasting Minsky's emphasis on upward insta-
bility with Keynes's focus on a depressed economy).
33. See De Antoni, supra note 31, at 2-5.
34. Minsky, Instability, supra note 32, at 6.
35. Id. at 5.
36. See MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 13, at 157-90. The aggregate amount
of profits equals the sum of investment plus consumption out of profits plus the govern-
ment's deficit and any trade surplus, less savings out of wages. See Dimitri B. Papadimi-
triou & L. Randall Wray, Minsky's Analysis of Financial Capitalism 6-9 (Jerome Levy
Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 275, 1999) ("In the simplest model (no government defi-
cits, balanced trade, and no savings out of wages) profits equal investment plus capital
consumption."); see also Janelia Tse, Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis, 4
OECONOMICUs 77, 79-80 (2001); De Antoni, supra note 31, at 5-13.
37. See MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 13, at 157-90.
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* to ensure that the demand price of capital assets is consistent with
the supply price;
* to ensure that debt finance commitments can be satisfied; and
* to ensure that resources are allocated to the investment sector.38
In a capitalist economy, these functions are discharged in the form of
two sets of prices: one for current output and one for capital assets.39 The
price of current output depends on short-run expectations of demand and
wage rates. Spending on investment depends on the demand price (the
price that a purchaser is willing to pay) and the supply price (the price
that a producer is willing to accept) of capital assets. Investment occurs
and profits are generated when the demand price of capital assets exceeds
the supply price. The latter is a function of the costs of production, which
consist primarily of purchase price (costs of labor plus a markup) and
financing costs. The former is a function of expectations about future
profits. In other words, capital asset prices reflect long-run expectations
of future profits, but also the borrower's and lender's risk associated with
the financing of investment. Borrower's risk is the risk of losing equity
with increased levels of borrowing. Lender's risk is the risk of default,
which increases with the level of debt financing.
Investment thereby links the price of capital assets with the price of
current production. But the uncertainty associated with expectations of
future profits and the financing of capital assets with debt makes the
economy unstable. Expectations of profits depend on future investment,
with realized profits determined by investment. In short, businesses in-
vest now because they expect investment to occur in the future. Financial
intermediaries are the critical actors in this process; they receive savings
from households that are provided to businesses for production, with a
reverse flow of funds moving from businesses to households again
through financial intermediaries. The flow of money to businesses occurs
as a response to expectations of future profits, while the flow of money
from businesses is financed by realized profits. Expectations of profits
determine the flow of financing contracts to businesses and the value of
those contracts, with the past, present, and future linked by these finan-
cial relations. Expectations are validated when realized profits equal or
exceed commitments in the financial contracts as the outcome of negotia-
tions between financial intermediaries and businesses. Minsky's descrip-
tion of financial relations is not limited, however, to businesses; it extends
to households and governments by way of their ability to borrow on the
basis of expectations of future cash flows. Moreover, his description ex-
tends to an open-economy setting when businesses, households, and gov-
ernments borrow internationally. 40
38. Id.; see also Tse, supra note 36, at 79.
39. Tse, supra note 36, at 80.
40. See Minsky, Instability, supra note 32, at 4-5; see also Philip Arestis & Murray
Glickman, Financial Crisis in Southeast Asia: Dispelling Illusion the Minskyan Way, 26
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 237, 237 (2002) (arguing that the sources of instability identified by
Minsky are intensified in an open-economy setting); Jan Kregel, Managing the Impact of
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The explanatory power of these essential features of Minsky's financial
instability hypothesis is captured in his two theorems. The first theorem
holds that the character of the financial relations predominating at any
time in an economy determines its financial stability.4 1 In this respect,
Minsky describes three states of financial relations characteristic of eco-
nomic units: hedge finance, speculative finance, and Ponzi finance. A
hedge finance unit is characterized by an ability to fulfill payment com-
mitments with realized cash flows. Because equity finance provides a
margin of safety in the event that realized profits are less than payment
commitments under debt contracts, economic units with greater weighted
levels of such finance will tend to be hedge finance units. A speculative
finance unit is one that can meet its interest and similar income account
commitments as they fall due, but cannot repay the amount of its princi-
pal repayment obligations and must roll over or refinance its liabilities on
maturity. A Ponzi finance unit is one that cannot fulfill its obligations to
pay interest or principal as they become due and must borrow against
rising asset prices or sell assets to meet these commitments. Equity fi-
nance, and the associated margin of safety, is reduced as a Ponzi unit
relies on either or both asset sales and further borrowing. An economy
that is dominated by hedge finance units is stable in the sense that it is
vulnerable only to external shocks. An economy that is dominated by
speculative and Ponzi finance units is unstable in the sense that it is vul-
nerable to shocks, both internal and external.
Minsky's second theorem holds that capitalist economies tend to move
from a financial structure dominated by hedge finance to a structure
dominated by speculative and Ponzi finance during "periods of prolonged
prosperity." 4 2 The transition occurs as realized profits continue to vali-
date debt, which increases expectations of future profit levels and invest-
ment financed by greater levels of debt.4 3 Financial intermediaries are
supposed to function as skeptics and prudently dampen the excessive en-
thusiasm of businesses so that realized profits are more likely to be suffi-
cient to fulfill commitments. 4 4 But, as Minsky emphasizes, financial
Volatility in International Capital Markets in an Uncertain World 4 (Levy Econ. Inst., Work-
ing Paper No. 558, 2009) (describing the transmission of financial instability through inter-
national capital flows and risk-management techniques of multinational banks).
41. Minsky, Instability, supra note 32, at 7-8.
42. Id. at 8. Much the same process is described by John Geanakoplos as the "lever-
age cycle." See John Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle 2 (Cowles Found. for Research in
Econ., Discussion Paper No. 1715, 2009), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/
dl7aldl715.pdf; see also Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Bubbles and Crises, 110 ECON. J.
236 (2000) (constructing a simple model in which agency problems associated with lever-
aged investment in risky assets cause those assets to be priced above their fundamental
value in the context of a credit expansion).
43. This process is famously captured by the label "irrational exuberance," which was
used by Alan Greenspan when he was chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank in
testimony before Congress, to describe the U.S. stock market bubble in the mid-1990s.
The label was arguably made that much more famous when Robert Shiller subsequently
used it as the title of his book describing the same asset price bubble. See ROBERT J.
SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 3 (1st ed. 2000).
44. Minsky, Instability, supra note 32, at 4.
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intermediaries are profit-seeking enterprises that innovate in their acqui-
sition of assets and marketing of liabilities.45 In effect, financial in-
termediaries constantly innovate in their profit-seeking role as
"merchants of debt" 46 and tend to fuel the transition to speculative and
Ponzi finance during periods of prolonged prosperity. Financial in-
termediaries and businesses (as well as households) become increasingly
confident and downplay the need for margins of safety while increasing
the price of capital assets.47 An ostensibly stable economy is essentially
destabilized by its tranquility, as past success leads to expanding credit
and the assumption of riskier positions. 48 A "Minsky moment" 49 can oc-
cur, for example, when the inevitable inflationary pressures lead mone-
tary authorities to tighten credit and an expansionary credit cycle tips
over to a credit contraction phase.50 Speculative units become Ponzi
units, and Ponzi units see their net wealth disappear. Debt deflation fol-
lows as financial intermediaries call in debts and tighten the provision of
new credit, while borrowers must sell assets to fulfill payment commit-
ments. The ensuing collapse of asset values and profits only exacerbates
the debt deflation, resulting in increasing bankruptcies, recession, and a
depression in the extreme. 5'
B. DERIVATIVES AND THE MISMEASUREMENT OF RISK AS SOURCES
OF FINANCIAL INSTABILITY
In contrast with neoclassical economic theory, Minsky takes seriously
the financial intermediation function, which he refers to generically as
"banking." 52 He describes a sophisticated capitalist economy as charac-
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id. ("ITihus, bankers . .. are merchants of debt who strive to innovate in the assets
they acquire and the liabilities they market.").
47. See generally REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 1; see also Caruana, supra note 15,
at 2 (emphasizing the feedback effects of "[c]redit extension and leverage, risk perceptions
and risk appetite, asset prices and economic activity," which together can make the finan-
cial system more complex and characterized by nonlinear dynamics); Geanakoplos, supra
note 42, at 16 (emphasizing the significance of reductions in collateral requirements during
periods of prosperity that are then increased in a debt deflationary environment).
48. Minsky, Instability, supra note 32, at 8.
49. Minksy never used the term "Minsky moment" to describe the downward shift in a
business cycle with the ensuing necessity to sell assets to meet payment commitments. The
term was apparently coined by a bond fund director, Paul McCulley, during the Russian
debt crisis. See Justin Lahart, In Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2007, at Al.
50. Minsky, Instability, supra note 32, at 8.
51. See, e.g., E. Philip Davis & Mark R. Stone, Corporate Financial Structure and Fi-
nancial Stability 4 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/04/124, 2004) (finding that the debt-equity
ratios of firms are correlated with investment and inventory declines following crises). The
process of debt deflation was first described by Irving Fisher. See Irving Fisher, The Debt-
Deflation Theory of Great Depressions, 1 ECONOMETRICA 337, 337 (1933).
52. MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 13, at 172-173 ("In today's standard eco-
nomic theory, an abstract nonfinancial economy is analyzed. Theorems about this abstract
economy are assumed to be essentially valid for economies with complex financial and
monetary institutions and usages . . . . [T]his logical jump is an act of faith .... ); see also
Papadimitriou & Wray, supra note 36, at 4-5 (describing the assumptions underlying the
orthodox microeconomic and macroeconomic models criticized by Minsky).
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terized by expensive capital assets and a sophisticated financial system
required for the deployment of such assets.53 Present money pays for the
resources needed for the creation and use of capital assets in production;
it is exchanged for liabilities that commit producing units to pay future
money in the form of profits at specified dates under specified conditions.
Borrowers and lenders expect that profits generated by the capital assets
will exceed financing commitments, but because this does not always turn
out to be the case, financial stability cannot be taken as an assumed
condition.
The dynamics of this financing function, which are described by Minsky
as the source of financial instability, do not depend on a premise of irra-
tionality on the part of investors along any behavioral margin.54 Rather,
the instability-breeding characteristics of the market for financial assets
are the product of rational responses to market signals, albeit with exac-
erbating behavioral dynamics attributable to human shortcomings such as
cognitive biases and the use of heuristics in decision making under uncer-
tainty.55 Minsky's challenge to neoclassical orthodoxy can be character-
ized, therefore, as a fundamental one distinguishing the market for
consumer goods and services from the market for financial assets.56 The
pricing mechanism of the former operates to allocate resources.57 In-
creased demand for an item triggers an increase in supply and vice versa,
with changes in price equating demand and supply such that markets
clear.58 Because of this process, the market for consumer goods and ser-
vices is equilibrium seeking: it is inherently stable, since only external
shocks can move the market pricing mechanism off course into a state of
disequilibrium. 59 As emphasized by Minsky's financial instability hypoth-
esis, the market for financial assets is much different because it is charac-
53. See MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 13, at 172-75.
54. See COOPER, supra note 31, at 101 ("[F]inancial instability is hard wired into the
mechanics of the asset and debt markets; it is therefore unnecessary to resort to the still-
contentious arguments of behavioural finance to demonstrate market instability. But this
is not to say that behavioural finance should be ignored, as this area can also give rise to
powerful positive feedback cycles."); Geanakoplos, supra note 42, at 3 ("But a crucial part
of my leverage cycle story is that every agent is acting perfectly rationally from his own
individual point of view."); see also ROBERT J. BARBERA, THE COST OF CAPITALISM: UN-
DERSTANDING MARKET MAYHEM AND STABILIZING OUR ECONOMIC FUTURE 186 (2009)
("[B]ehavioral finance ... provides modern day insights that buttress Minsky's financial
instability hypothesis. Championing the notion that mainstream theory should embrace
important parts of Minsky's thesis, in effect, also amounts to ending the fringe status of
behavioral finance.").
55. Shiller provides a thorough account of various factors driving the herd mentality
that produces the kind of powerful positive feedback effects emphasized by Minsky. See
SHILLER, supra note 43, at 149-53; Robert J. Shiller, Human Behavior and the Efficiency of
the Financial System, HANDBOOK OF MACROECONOMICS 1 (John B. Taylor & Michael
Woodford eds., 1999); GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS:
How HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL
CAPITALISM 11-56, 131-48 (2009); see also ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000).
56. MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 13, at 141.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 114.
59. See id.
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terized by the search for scarcity value in an environment in which supply
does not respond completely to changes in price. 60 An increase in price
can stimulate increased demand without a corresponding increase in sup-
ply, while a decrease in price can cause a decrease in demand without a
contraction of supply. 61 In this type of market, it is the rate of price
change that affects demand rather than price change itself;62 such a mar-
ket is not equilibrium seeking and is inherently unstable.
Orthodox financial theory has tended to ignore these fundamental dif-
ferences and has largely transplanted the pricing mechanism of the mar-
ket for consumer goods and services as a conceptual framework for the
modeling of the pricing mechanism of the market for financial assets.63
As expressed in the "efficient market hypothesis," 64 this orthodoxy posits
that at any point in time, the price of particular financial assets incorpo-
rates all relevant information-concerning both the present and the fu-
ture-and is the correct price as determined by the forces of supply and
demand.65 Prices are seen to move in response to new information,66 and
only external shocks can force the market into a state of disequilibrium. 67
Price movements are entirely random,68 with this characteristic of finan-
60. COOPER, supra note 31, at 8. But see RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR
OwN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION
212-13 (2007) (emphasizing demand and supply of liquidity as the principal driver of price
movements rather than the revelation of information).
61. MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 13, at 141-43 (explaining circumstances
under which a capitalist economy can "sometimes break[] down").
62. COOPER, supra note 31, at 8; see also Jack Treynor, Bulls, Bears, and Market Bub-
bles, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 69, 69 (arguing that investors' different views
mean that there are winners and losers as prices change in response to new information,
with the resulting wealth effect creating a new equilibrium and wealth shift that can cause
greater subsequent price changes).
63. For accessible and entertaining accounts of the development of financial theory,
see PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS EVOLVING (2007) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN,
EVOLVING]; PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF
RISK (1996); PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MOD-
ERN WALL STREET (1992).
64. The efficient market hypothesis is the outcome of a deep literature, which attempts
to explain the apparently random price movements in markets for financial assets and
commodities. For a bibliographic, as well as temporal, listing of the various research contri-
butions to the development of the efficient market hypothesis along with significant contri-
butions to the behavioral finance school of thought, see Martin Sewell, History of the
Efficient Market Hypothesis (August 2008), available at http://www.e-m-h.org/emh-history.
pdf. See also JUSTIN Fox, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK,
REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009). For seminal articles, in the sense that
they are generally accepted as presenting the first and most complete articulations of the
efficient market hypothesis, see Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices,
FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.-Oct. 1965, at 55 [hereinafter Fama, Random]; Eugene F. Fama,
The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. Bus. 34 (1965) [hereinafter Fama, Behavior];
and Paul A. Samuelson, Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6
INDUS. MGMT. REV. 41 (1965). See also Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A
Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 384-88 (1970) (defining different
forms of the efficient market hypothesis).
65. See Fama, Random, supra note 64, at 56.
66. Id. at 36.
67. COOPER, supra note 31, at 13.
68. See Fama, Behavior, supra note 64, at 34.
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cial markets providing the conceptual foundation for risk management
and trading strategies. 69 Most importantly perhaps, an assumption of
random future price movements has permitted the modeling of such
movements on the basis of normal probability distributions, 70 which has
become the foundation for risk-management strategies using derivative
financial instruments.
Indeed, it is the development of a broad range of sophisticated deriva-
tive financial instruments, along with the provision of increased depth
and liquidity of markets, which is routinely heralded as the principal effi-
ciency-enhancing product of financial innovation undertaken during the
prolonged period of prosperity from the mid-1980s to the present. The
current financial landscape is thus characterized by an increasingly ex-
panded range of positions-both long and short-in markets for the un-
derlying assets on which derivatives are written.7' The apparent result is
a significant transformation of the relatively simplistic description of the
debt-financing function articulated by Minsky. Yet the difference in the
financial landscape is fundamentally one of degree and not one of kind.72
As a source of instability, Minsky emphasizes the role of debt-financing
of capital assets.73 Derivative financial instruments simply provide an en-
hanced ability to place bets on price movements and to replicate lever-
aged positions in assets. By allowing investors to transact in asset
markets at low cost, they have provided an ability to shed risk by trans-
ferring it to parties who are assumed to be better able to bear it and to
take on greater risk by scaling up bets on future price movements. 74 But
in much the same way as the debt financing of capital assets, the resulting
leverage effect-especially in the latter instance-is an additional source
of financial instability for the same reasons identified by Minsky.
Moreover, instability associated with excessive risk taking and leverage
using derivative financial instruments may be compounded by the mis-
69. See id. at 40.
70. Id. at 40-41.
71. See generally Stewart Mayhew, The Impact of Derivatives on Cash Markets: What
Have We Learned? (Dept. of Banking & Fin., Terry Coll. of Bus., Univ. of Ga., Working
Paper, 2000), available at http://www.terry.uga.edu/finance/research/working-papers/
papers/impact.pdf (surveying the empirical literature and concluding that the evidence sug-
gests that derivatives have either had no effect on volatility in underlying markets or have
reduced volatility and have tended to improve the liquidity of these markets as well as the
quality of information).
72. In his account of financial crises from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, Minsky
notes a range of innovations that permitted the banking sector, in particular, to avoid re-
serve requirements. See MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 13, at 15-106; see also
Hyman P. Minsky, Securitization 1-8 (Levy Econ. Inst., Policy Note No. 2, 2008) (describ-
ing the causes and effects of securitization as an "originate and distribute" approach to the
banking function); Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis,
21 CRmCAL REV. 195 (2009) (emphasizing the use of securitization by banks to avoid
capital adequacy requirements).
73. Minsky, Securitization, supra note 72, at 1-3.
74. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 31, at 9-14, 18, 143-53 (drawing a link between the
financial instability hypothesis and risk-management strategies based on the efficient mar-
ket hypothesis); see also Charles J. Whalen, The U.S. Credit Crunch of 2007: A Minsky
Moment 12-13 (Levy Econ. Inst., Pub. Policy Brief No. 92, 2007).
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measurement of risk.75 Despite an apparent ill fit with the data, the in-
tegrity of the risk-transfer market remains bound up in the efficient
market hypothesis and its assumption of random price movements. 76 It is
now increasingly recognized, however, that this assumption is incorrect,
and risk-management models that are slavishly based on it systematically
understate risk, contributing further to instability.77 In other words, risk
may be mismeasured because markets for financial assets differ funda-
mentally from markets for consumer goods and services. In particular,
price movements in the market for financial assets are affected by the
past in the sense that they tend to exhibit positive feedback effects, char-
acterized by a kind of memory and the associated clustering of sharp
price movements.78 The positive feedback effects mean that standard
probability distributions tend to understate extremes of price move-
ments-both positively and negatively-which can only be captured in
nonstandard distributions characterized by "fat tails" and "double
peaks." 79
75. See, e.g., Stefan Thurner, J. Doyne Farmer & John Geanakoplos, Leverage Causes
Fat Tails and Clustered Volatility, available at http://www.arxiv.org/PSs cachearxiv/pdf/0908/
0908.1555v2.pdf (constructing a model of leveraged asset acquisitions with margin calls to
demonstrate that leverage causes price fluctuations to become heavy tailed, displaying the
clustered volatility characteristic of price fluctuations observed in real markets).
76. But see Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics 2
(Ctr. for European Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 91, 2003), available at http://www.
princeton.edu/-ceps/workingpapers/91malkiel.pdf (reviewing the challenges to the effi-
cient market hypothesis in the academic literature and concluding that "stock markets are
more efficient and less predictable" than these challenges suggest).
77. BENOIT B. MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE (MIS)BEHAVIOR OF MAR-
KETS: A FRACTAL VIEW OF RISK, RUIN, AND REWARD 32, 79-107 (2004) (contrasting the
"wild randomness" of financial markets with the "mild" randomness permitted by the effi-
cient market hypothesis). The same general point is made by Nassim Nicholas Taleb. See
generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, FOOLED By RANDOMNESS: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF
CHANCE IN LIFE AND IN THE MARKETS (2d ed. 2004); NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE
BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2007); BOOKSTABER, supra note
60, at 143-64 (characterizing the derivatives market as a complex and tightly coupled net-
work, attributable to the combination of liquidity and leverage, and thereby subject to
crises when all contingencies cannot be anticipated); COOPER, supra note 31, at 151-52
(observing that the risk-management industry may inadvertently encourage excessive risk
taking by producing probability distributions that are too narrow); Colander, Follmer,
Haas, Goldberg, Juselius, Kirman, Lux & Sloth, supra note 4, at 4-7 (labeling as "control
illusion" the false confidence provided by mathematical risk-management models based on
an assumption of a normal probability distribution of asset price changes); Thurner,
Farmer & Geanakoplos, supra note 75, at 4-6 (arguing that sophisticated risk-management
techniques exacerbate extreme price fluctuations).
78. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to
Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP., no. 2, 1990 at 19-20, 24 (arguing that investor demand for risky
assets is affected by "beliefs or sentiments that are not fully justified by fundamental news"
and that changes in such sentiments are not fully countered by the arbitrage trading of
rational investors).
79. See, e.g., Jon Danielsson, Blame the Models, 4 J. FIN. STABILITY 321 (2008) (con-
cluding that statistical models are useful for measuring the risk of frequent small events but
not systemically important events); see also FIN. SERVS. AuTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A
REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 39-49 (Mar. 2009), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Corporate/turner/index.shtml [hereinafter TURNER
REVIEW] (emphasizing the significance for capital adequacy requirements of the under-
statement of tail risk); Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir. for Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng.,
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In sum, the source of financial instability emphasized by Minsky-ex-
cessive leverage-is substantially magnified by the introduction of a
broad range of derivative financial instruments as both risk-creation and
risk-transfer contracts in an environment characterized by mismeasure-
ment of asset price risk.80 In fact, Minsky's two theorems, which focus on
the debt-financed acquisition of capital assets,8 ' can be seen to apply
analogously to transactions in derivatives. As already noted, the develop-
ment of a broad range of derivative financial instruments has completed
markets by providing economic units with desired payoffs for a broad
range of contingencies that were previously unavailable. 82 Hedge finance
units can use this expanded range of positions to reduce their risk in risk-
transfer transactions that are equivalent to insurance.83 Speculative and
Ponzi finance units can use the same instruments, however, to place
larger bets on price movements.84 Proprietary trading desks and some
hedge funds, for example, use sophisticated modeling techniques to iden-
tify price anomalies and the associated arbitrage opportunities, which are
seized by taking positions often using substantial amounts of leverage.85
But where price anomalies persist because of positive feedback effects,
trading models can be subject to tracking error, and mark-to-market
losses may be incurred in ever increasing size. 86 The accrued losses trig-
Why Banks Failed the Stress Test, Speech at Marcus-Evans Conference on Stress-Testing
in London, England (Feb. 9-10, 2009), available at http://www.bankofengland/publications/
speeches/. . ./speech374.pdf (identifying disaster myopia, network externalities, and mis-
aligned incentives as the sources of market failure that can cause mismeasurement of mar-
ket risk); Rene M. Stulz, Risk Management Failures: What Are They and When Do They
Happen? 7-14 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2008-03-017, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1278073 (providing a taxonomy of risk management failures, in-
cluding the "mismeasurement of known risks" which can be the result of (1) the use of an
incorrect probability distribution, (2) mismeasurement of the correlation of returns across
positions, or (3) mistakes in information collection).
80. See, e.g., Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Fourth Quadrant: A Map of the Limit of
Statistics, EDGE, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.edge.org/3rd culture/taleb08/taleb08_index.
html (concluding that an analysis of the power coefficient on data for a range of financial
instruments indicates a value of between two and three, with a mean absolute error greater
than one, which has devastating consequences for predictive value).
81. Minsky, Instability, supra note 32, at 7-8.
82. See, e.g., Minsky, Securitization, supra note 72, at 2.
83. See Minsky, Instability, supra note 32, at 7.
84. See Stulz, supra note 79, at 14 (emphasizing the need to make capital "available to
cope with unknown risks" that, if known and captured in the relevant models, would alter
the behavior of managers).
85. Because this form of arbitrage trading provides likely small gains and a small
chance of large losses, it has been described as the equivalent of "picking up nickels in
front of bulldozers." See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND
FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 102 (2000). The phrase actually refers to
"risk arbitrage" transactions, which are pure bets on the price movements of the shares of
corporations that are expected to merge. This particular strategy differs significantly from
convergence trades, relative value trades, and volatility trades, which are hedged trading
strategies based on the identification of pricing anomalies.
86. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 35
(1997) (arguing that arbitrage trading, as conducted by a small number of specialized inves-
tors, requires capital and entails risk, which has "implications for security pricing, including
the possibility that arbitrage becomes ineffective" when "prices diverge far from funda-
mental values"); Shleifer & Summers, supra note 78, at 20-23 (emphasizing the limited and
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ger margin calls that must be met by unwinding positions, which places
further downward pressure on prices in markets that are often lacking
depth. The resulting liquidity crisis can precipitate default for speculative
and Ponzi finance units employing arbitrage-trading strategies or other-
wise taking unhedged positions that are tantamount to "naked" bets on
price movements.87 As a specific example of this dynamic, the recent
credit crisis differs from other financial crises only in the nature of the
risk that was transacted and mispriced.88 Rather than asset price risk,
credit risk was the focus of the innovative "originate and distribute"
model of banking used to extend mortgage financing to Ponzi-financed
households. 89 The stripping of this risk and its transfer through credit
default swaps was priced, however, using models that severely underesti-
mated it.90
C. MINSKY'S POLICY AGENDA
Because of the significance of financial relations and expectations of
profits that underlie those relations, Minsky sees a sophisticated capitalist
economy as inherently unstable;91 there is no equilibrium, but only
phases of expanding or contracting credit.92 There will be periods of
tranquility when economic units are predominantly hedge finance units,
but instability is latent as expectations of future profits become increas-
ingly optimistic and economic units increasingly take on debt to finance
increased investment.93 The key aspect of Minsky's financial instability
hypothesis is, therefore, the notion that business cycles are the result of
the internal workings of a capitalist economy and not external shocks. 94
risky nature of arbitrage trading in an environment dominated by changes in price as a
function of changes in sentiments and beliefs). But see generally Jefferson Duarte, Francis
A. Longstaff & Fan Yu, Risk and Return in Fixed Income Arbitrage: Nickels in Front of a
Steamroller? 20 REV. FIN. STUD. 769 (2007) (concluding that fixed-income arbitrage strate-
gies tend to yield positively-skewed supernormal returns).
87. The most notable case study of this dynamic is When Genius Failed: The Rise and
Fall of Long-Term Capital Management. See generally LOWENSTEIN, supra note 85;
NICHOLAS DUNBAR, INVENTING MONEY: THE STORY OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGE-
MENT AND THE LEGENDS BEHIND IT (2000).
88. See Jan Kregel, Minsky's Cushions of Safety: Systemic Risk and the Crisis in the
U.S. Subprime Mortgage Market 5 (Levy Econ. Inst., Pub. Policy Brief No. 93, 2008).
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., id. (emphasizing that the recent credit crisis was "the result of insufficient
margins of safety" caused by the mispricing of risk in the U.S. subprime mortgage market);
Barry Eichengreen, Origins and Responses to the Crisis 6 (Oct. 2008) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/eichengreen/el83_spO7/origins-
responses.pdf (noting that the credit risk models were based on a truncated and unrepre-
sentative sample and were misspecified in their understatement of tail risk).
91. See Minsky, Instability, supra note 32, at 2-4.
92. See Geanakoplos, supra note 42, at 1 (emphasizing the same feature with availabil-
ity of credit determined by margin requirements).
93. See Minsky, Instability, supra note 32, at 7-8.
94. MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 13, at 172 ("[I]nstability is determined by
mechanisms within the system, not outside it; our economy is not unstable because it is
shocked by oil, wars, or monetary surprises, but because of its nature."). "Real business
cycle theory" emphasizes external shocks, such as technology changes, as causes of the
business cycle. See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS ch. 19 (5th ed. 2003).
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Economies are not, as such, equilibrium-seeking. Once they tip into a
debt deflation, the process feeds on itself, and government must inter-
vene to prop up aggregate demand and profits through deficit spending.
Most importantly, the transfer payment system provides a floor for per-
sonal income, employment, and profits. The effect of a debt deflation on
balance sheets can also cause the failure of one or more financial in-
termediaries, and central banks must serve as lenders of last resort for the
banking system, providing loans and/or purchasing impaired assets to
prevent systemic failure attributable to the interlocking nature of rela-
tions among financial intermediaries. 95 In discharging this function, cen-
tral banks provide a floor for asset prices. As Minsky observes,
government has to be sufficiently large to discharge both of these func-
tions.96 Nonetheless, instability remains and is only moderated in its ef-
fects. 97 Regulatory regimes attempt to address the associated moral
hazard problem, which has been brought to the forefront of the public
policy debate by the recent credit crisis.98
In an attempt to moderate financial instability, Minsky articulates a
policy agenda that is not limited to regulatory supervision,9 9 although it is
his emphasis on the central bank's lender of last resort function as the
principal stabilizing instrument in financial markets that has been empha-
sized by various commentators and fleshed out in more detail.100 Minsky
95. But see John Geanakoplos, Solving the Present Crisis and Managing the Leverage
Cycle 1-6, 11-20 (Cowles Found. for Research in Econ., Working Paper No. 1751, 2010),
available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/-gean/crisis/solving-present-crisis.pdf (outlining a
more ambitious response to the credit crisis, including initiatives intended to prop up hous-
ing prices).
96. See Davis & Stone, supra note 51, at 4 (finding that financial crises have a greater
impact on expenditure and the financing of the corporate sector in emerging economies,
despite greater levels of precautionary liquidity); see also Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos,
Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy, 98 AM. EcoN. REV. 1211, 1211 (2008) (articu-
lating a pricing theory for emerging asset classes explaining how leverage cycles can cause
contagion, flight to collateral, and credit rationing).
97. See Piero Ferri & Hyman P. Minsky, Market Processes and Thwarting Systems 4
(Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 64, 1991) ("[I]nstitutions and interventions thwart
the instability breeding dynamics that are natural to market economies by interrupting the
endogenous process and 'starting' the economy again with non market [sic] determined
values as 'initial conditions."').
98. See generally IMF, Lessons of the Financial Crisis for Future Regulation of Finan-
cial Institutions and Markets and for Liquidity Management (Policy Paper, 2009) [hereinaf-
ter IMF, Lessons], available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/020409.pdf. See
also TURNER REVIEW, supra note 79, at 51-103.
99. See generally Charles J. Whalen, Stabilizing the Unstable Economy: More on the
Minsky-Simons Connection, 25 J. ECON. ISSUEs 739 (1991) (reviewing similarities of analy-
ses of the causes of business cycles of Minsky and Henry Simons, as well as some of their
shared policy prescriptions).
100. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 31, at 124-25 (arguing that credit creation running
substantially ahead of economic growth signals the development of an asset price bubble,
which monetary authorities should control by contracting the supply of credit); BARBERA,
supra note 54, at 188-89 (emphasizing the need for monetary policy to moderate asset
price bubbles and monitor the appetite for risk as reflected in the spread between "long-
term rates on risky assets" and long-term rates on government treasury bills); see also
Geanakoplos, supra note 42, at 3-6 (emphasizing the need for monitoring of leverage and
its limitation during periods of prosperity as a complement to government intervention to
support profits and asset prices during a debt deflation); L. Randall Wray, Financial Mar-
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also advocates an aggressive antitrust policy designed to limit the size of
institutions in the financial sector such that no one institution will be seen
as "too big to fail."' 01 The government would also act as employer of last
resort by providing public service employment. 102 This role is in addition
to the use of counter-cyclical fiscal policy to prop up aggregate demand
when private investment slows. But in terms of informative detail, Min-
sky's discussion of the tax system as a fiscal policy instrument can be ig-
nored without any appreciable loss of important insights. Indeed, this
aspect of Minsky's policy agenda, which focuses primarily on the broad
mix of taxes, is extremely general and somewhat conventional.
Not surprisingly, Minksy argues that the tax system should provide the
government with sufficient revenue to support aggregate demand and
profits in the face of a debt deflation.103 To realize this goal, he advocates
a combination of a broad-based sales tax, preferably on the value-added
model, and a progressive-rate personal income tax.104 He prefers that the
corporate income tax be eliminated on the apparent assumption that it is
shifted forward to consumers and is inflationary. 0 5 Otherwise, Minsky
has very little to say regarding the second-order details of tax design. He
observes that the deductibility of corporate interest expense provides an
undesirable tax bias in favor of debt finance in the context of an other-
wise unintegrated tax on equity income.106 Without much in the way of
supporting analysis, he prefers conduit treatment of corporate income to
prevent use of the corporate form as a tax-avoidance vehicle.' 0 7 With ap-
parent administrative and compliance costs in mind, he suggests broad
application of the real estate investment trust (REIT) approach whereby
a corporation that has distributed a minimum amount of its income annu-
ally is exempt from the tax that otherwise applies to nonqualifying corpo-
rations.108 Much more interestingly, he argues that "nonproduction
expenses such as advertising, marketing, and the pleasures of the execu-
tive suites," should not be deductible for corporate income tax pur-
kets Meltdown: What Can We Learn from Minsky? 8 (Levy Econ. Inst., Pub. Policy Brief
No. 94A, 2008) (emphasizing a focus on direct credit controls as well as supervision and
regulation). But see Caruana, supra note 15, at 5 (noting difficulties in attempting to iso-
late a single variable that can reliably track the financial cycle).
101. See MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 13, at 330.
102. See Hyman P. Minsky, Uncertainty and the Institutional Structure of Capitalist
Economies 45 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 155, 1996) [hereinafter Minsky,
Uncertainty].
103. Id. at 4.
104. MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 13, at 339-43. But see Minsky, Uncer-
tainty, supra note 102, at 5 (recommending the replacement of the personal income tax
with a progressive personal consumption tax and a value added tax in order to fund a move
from transfer payments to full-employment policies).
105. MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 13, at 341.
106. Id. at 340.
107. Minsky says nothing about the treatment of losses. Id.
108. Minsky is unclear whether the corporate income tax should be integrated with the
shareholder-level tax, although he seems to cryptically suggest as much following his brief
discussion of the REIT model. See MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 13, at 342
("Either way, a unified income tax should be the major pillar of the tax system.").
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poses.109 In effect, these expenses are considered returns to capital and
should be treated consistently with returns to equity. He also notes,
somewhat cryptically and briefly in passing, that tax policymakers need
"to consider the behavior modification aspects of tax policy and use the
expected tax avoidance reaction to foster policy goals." 110 In this respect,
he follows the standard legal definition of "tax avoidance" as a modifica-
tion of behavior that legally results in a decrease or elimination of a taxed
activity. 11 "Tax evasion," which is illegal, is defined as the nonpayment
of taxes while continuing to carry on a taxed activity.112
As Parts IV and V attempt to illustrate, Minsky's financial instability
hypothesis can be seen to have broad policy relevance for the resolution
of certain tax-base rule choices, which have conventionally been framed
as technical tax-policy issues. In fact, that relevance goes much deeper
than was recognized by Minsky. I suggest first, however, in the following
Part III, that a greater depth of policy analysis can be realized by refram-
ing many of these rule choices as the subject of a tax-expenditure analysis
focused on the moderation of excessive leverage and risk taking as the
sources of financial instability emphasized by Minsky.
III. TAX EXPENDITURES, TAX-EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS,
AND CORRECTIVE TAXES
The literature on tax expenditures-both generally and in terms of
analyses of particular programs-is deep and rich. No attempt is made
here to come to grips with that literature. 113 Instead, this Part does noth-
ing more than emphasize a general point that is more thoroughly devel-
oped by Neil Brooks. 114 That is, a substantial slice of the tax-expenditure
literature-especially the literature in the United States-has under-
mined the significance of the tax-expenditure concept by unnecessarily
focusing on the need to classify particular rules in tax legislation as either
technical tax rules or tax expenditures.115 Contentiousness over the exe-
cution of this exercise has undercut the two important functions of the
tax-expenditure concept: (1) the budgetary accounting function, and (2)
the policy analysis function. In this respect, it is suggested below in Part
III.B that the manner in which the policy case in support of a particular
provision is framed goes a long way in executing the necessary classifica-
tion exercise for a broad range of provisions without any contentious-
109. Id. at 340.
110. Id.
111. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1460 (6th ed. 1990).
112. Id. at 1461.
113. For a comprehensive review of much of this literature, see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. &
Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its International Dimension,
27 VA. TAX REV. 437 (2008).
114. See Neil Brooks, The Under-Appreciated Implications of the Tax Expenditure Con-
cept, in AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS TAx REFORM IN RETROSPECT AND PROSPEcr 233, 234-37
(Chris Evans & Richard Krever eds., 2009); see also Edward D. Kleinbard, How Tax Ex-
penditures Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 123 TAX NOTEs 925 (2009).
115. See Kleinbard, supra note 114, at 925.
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ness.11 6 For a minority of provisions, alternative modes of framing will be
plausible and a tax-expenditure classification can defensibly be made for
budgetary accounting purposes. Moreover, the full policy analyst's tool-
kit, encompassing both technical and budgetary criteria, can still be use-
fully applied.
At a more specific level relevant to the subject of this article, tax-ex-
penditure analysis provides a conceptual framework that suggests direc-
tions in which Minsky's financial instability hypothesis might push the
analysis of some important tax-base rule choices. As a tool of policy anal-
ysis, tax-expenditure analysis may be invoked by a change in emphasis on
the consequential attributes of these rule choices attributable to the rec-
ognition of the potential significance of his financial instability
hypothesis.
A. EXECUTING THE CLASSIFICATION EXERCISE BY SPECIFYING A
BENCHMARK INCOME TAX
The tax-expenditure concept is deceptively simple. It requires the divi-
sion of all rules in a tax system into two categories: technical tax rules and
tax-expenditure provisions.117 The first set of rules defines the tax base,
unit, period, and rate structure." 8 The specific rules in each of these ar-
eas form the technical structure of the system designed to raise reve-
nue.119 Tax-expenditure provisions are spending programs delivered
through the tax system in the form of exceptions to that structure; they
are designed to realize certain economic or social policies otherwise asso-
ciated with comparable spending programs using alternative delivery
mechanisms. 120
Although politicians and policymakers have long recognized that gov-
ernments spend through the tax system,121 the tax-expenditure concept
was not developed in detail until the 1960s and early 1970s by Stanley
Surrey,122 who popularized the concept, coined the phrase, and wrote two
definitive works on the subject.123 According to Surrey, much of the de-
bate about specific tax provisions and their reform is really an issue of
116. See, e.g., id. at 927 ("Tax expenditure analysis is a pragmatic exercise, and the
existence of a handful of close questions should not obscure the fact that literally hundreds
of other cases can be labelled as tax expenditures without much controversy.").
117. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 3 (1985).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 1.
120. Id. at 3.
121. See, e.g., Neil Brooks, Book Review, 34 CAN. TAX J. 681, 683 (1986) (reviewing
STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985)) (citing William
Gladstone's Parliamentary critique of an income tax exemption for charities as spending
through the tax system).
122. But see Harry A. Shannon III, The Tax Expenditure Concept in the United States
and Germany: A Comparison, 33 TAX NOTEs 201, 203-05 (1986) (describing the develop-
ment of the tax-expenditure concept in Germany in the 1950s).
123. See generally SURREY & McDANIEL, supra note 117; STANLEY S. SURREY, PATH-
WAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973).
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spending reform. 124 The tax-expenditure concept allows the debate to be
joined in terms of budgetary criteria relevant to such reform. From the
outset of its development, however, the tax-expenditure concept has been
contentious.125 Proponents have argued that the concept helps to clarify
the size of government spending while also providing an analytical tool to
assess the desirability of particular rules formally embedded in tax legisla-
tion. Critics have emphasized the problematic nature of a perceived need
to identify a benchmark tax system as a premise for characterization of
deviations as equivalent to spending programs.
The genesis of this definitional debate is undoubtedly the related criti-
ques of the comprehensive tax base and the tax-expenditure concept ar-
ticulated by Boris Bittker at the outset of the development of both. 126
Beginning with Bittker, critics of the tax-expenditure concept have ar-
gued that the Haig-Simons concept of income, 127 which the comprehen-
sive tax base is seen to operationalize, is too difficult to translate into a
workable norm. Furthermore, it says nothing about certain issues, such
as the appropriate tax unit.128 In response, some proponents of the tax-
expenditure concept have rejected the Haig-Simons concept of income in
favor of a benchmark tax structure expressed in terms of what is widely
accepted by tax analysts. 129 Others have vigorously defended the
Haig-Simons concept of income as the basis for characterizing particular
rules as tax expenditures, thereby triggering an accounting and analysis as
spending programs. 130
The lingering effects of the conceptual noise created by this perceived
need to identify the elements of a benchmark tax system are evident in a
recent report on tax expenditures prepared by the Staff of the U.S. Joint
Committee on Taxation (Joint Committee). In an attempt to avoid the
characterization problems of the past, the Joint Committee report in-
troduces what is described as "a new paradigm for classifying tax provi-
sions as tax expenditures."13 1 In particular, the report proposes use of
the existing provisions of U.S. income tax law as the reference point for
124. See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 117, at 69-70.
125. See Brooks, supra note 114, at 233.
126. See generally Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the Na-
tional Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969); Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base"
as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967).
127. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF IN-
COME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938) (defining income as the sum of present
consumption and future consumption, which is represented by changes in wealth); R. Mur-
ray Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME
TAX 1, 1-28 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921).
128. See generally Haig, supra note 127.
129. See SURREY & McDANIEL, supra note 117, at 186-88; see also Dirk-Jan Kraan,
Off-budget and Tax Expenditures, 4 OECD J. ON BUDGETING 121 (2004) (indicating
OECD support of a benchmark based on current practice rather than a theoretical ideal).
130. See, e.g., Fleming & Peroni, supra note 113, at 450-456.
131. STAFF OF JOINT COMMIT-E ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION
OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 1 (Comm. Print 2008), available at http://www.house.gov/
jct/x-37-08.pdf [hereinafter JCT, RECONSIDERATION].
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classification purposes,132 which is supposed to avoid contentiousness sur-
rounding the articulation of a theoretically pure benchmark. The report
proposes that tax provisions be characterized as tax expenditures if they
can be considered either:
* "deliberately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of the
present tax law" (referred to as "Tax Subsidies");1 33 or
* a structural element of the Internal Revenue Code that "materially
affects] economic decisions in a manner that imposes substantial
economic efficiency costs" (referred to as "Tax-Induced Structural
Distortions"). 134
After reviewing the historical development of tax-expenditure analysis
in the United States, as well as the standard critiques of it, the Joint Com-
mittee report elaborates this proposed taxonomy in some detail, includ-
ing a discussion of three subcategories of tax subsidies: (1) tax transfers,
(2) social spending, and (3) business synthetic spending.13 5 The report
emphasizes the use of the tax-expenditure concept as an analytical tool,
with the proposed approach to characterization intended to allow tax-
expenditure analysis to "serve as an effective and neutral analytical tool
for policymakers in their consideration of individual tax proposals or
larger tax reforms."136 This emphasis is much different than that in other
countries where the tax-expenditure concept is used primarily as a weak
budgetary accounting tool.1 3 7 The Joint Committee report downplays
this role, perhaps because of the apparent failure of the tax-expenditure
account to control U.S. federal government spending.' 38 Yet, the tax-ex-
penditure concept may well have its singularly independent policy signifi-
cance in performing a budgetary accounting function, with
characterization problems being much less problematic when the concept
is limited to this role.
Perhaps more importantly-given the stated goal of the Joint Commit-
tee report to enhance the analytical function of the tax-expenditure con-
132. Id.
133. Id. at 9.
134. Id. at 10; see also Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Lan-
guage, 57 TAx L. REV. 187, 212, 228-30 (2004) (arguing in favor of "a separate category for
'structural' rules" that deviate from a theoretically pure income tax and "from conven-
tional tax expenditures that seem more politically interchangeable with appropriations").
Much the same distinction has recently been proposed for reporting purposes in New
Zealand. See generally Craig Fookes, Spending Through the Tax System: Tax Expenditures
(N.Z. Treasury, Policy Perspectives Paper No. 09/01, 2009), available at http://www.
treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy/ppp/2009/09-01.
135. JCT, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 131, at 10.
136. Id. at 1.
137. See Shaviro, supra note 134, at 205 (observing that the intensity of the classifica-
tion debate appears to be unique to the experience in the United States). The emphasis on
a weak budgetary accounting function may be responsible, in part at least, for the much
less contentious status of the tax-expenditure account in other countries.
138. JCT, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 131, at 4 (noting that the first description of
tax expenditures in 1972 consisted of 60 items, while thirty-five years later the description
had expanded to 170 items using the same characterization approach).
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cept 139-it is unclear whether the suggested characterization approach
really does much to advance the whole tax-expenditure enterprise as a
policymaking tool. In short, because the suggested categories are in no
way self-executing, it is not obvious that the proposed frame of reference
solves what is assumed to be an insoluble problem. 140 In fact, the pro-
posed taxonomy of tax expenditures appears to be based on the incorrect
premise that characterization as a tax-expenditure provision accomplishes
nothing unique for analytical purposes. An assumption of tax-policy ag-
nosticism on this characterization issue is presumably advocated as a
means to free policymakers to posit any set of rule choices, with the pos-
sibilities assessed on the basis of their efficiency and distributional effects,
as well as administrative and compliance costs. Labeling a particular rule
as a tax-expenditure provision apparently does nothing to advance this
necessary policy analysis of the consequential attributes of possible rule
choices.
It is more than just a bit ironic, however, that as a means to enhance
the analytical function, any difference in policy analysis triggered by a
tax-expenditure characterization is deemphasized, necessarily reducing
the significance of the classification exercise. But technical tax-policy
analysis and tax-expenditure analysis, albeit focused on the same conse-
quential attributes, remain decidedly different because of a decidedly dif-
ferent emphasis on those attributes. It is this difference in emphasis that
is central to the classification exercise when the government discharges its
allocative function using a particular policy instrument.141 Adopting the
taxonomy suggested in the Joint Committee report, a tax-induced struc-
tural distortion is only sensibly included as a tax expenditure if the associ-
ated behavioral response is intended by policymakers. Indeed, deliberate
inconsistency with an identifiable general rule of the present law as indic-
ative of a tax subsidy can only be determined if it can be concluded that
the behavioral response at issue is one that is intended by policymak-
ers.14 2 The concept of a benchmark income tax base-however it may be
conceived-is utterly irrelevant to this classification exercise.
139. Id. at 1.
140. For example, the study cites tax relief for charitable donations as a supposedly
clear example of a tax rule in its tax-subsidy category. Id. at 12. It is not obvious, however,
that tax relief, in the form of either a tax credit or an income deduction, for charitable
donations can be considered deliberately inconsistent with an identifiable general rule of
the present tax law. Similar characterization questions would appear to arise with the two
examples of tax-induced structural distortions cited in the study: (1) deferral of foreign-
source income earned through a foreign corporation, and (2) the different treatment of
corporate interest expense and dividends. Id. at 10, 55.
141. See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, TAXES, SPENDING, AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S
MARCH ToWARD BANKRUPTCY 174-93 (2007); Shaviro, supra note 134, at 218-21.
142. JCT, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 131, at 9.
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B. EMPHASIZING BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE IN THE PRESENCE OF
MARKET FAILURE
Brooks observes that there are two general problems with a perceived
need to define a benchmark income tax system as the gateway to classifi-
cation of particular rules as tax expenditures. 143 First, it is not clear what
normative principles underlie such a system.144 Second, even if such a
principle could be identified, operationalizing it involves balancing politi-
cal and administrative considerations. These problems were similarly em-
phasized by Bittker,145 and, as Brooks notes, they do not in any way
undermine the usefulness of the tax-expenditure concept, which, as a
form of conceptual reasoning, does not depend on "an empirical or nor-
mative judgment." 146 Disputes about the precise dividing line between
technical tax rules and tax-expenditure provisions do not mean, there-
fore, that the concept is incoherent and cannot serve its purpose of pro-
moting clarity of thought.147 Yet, this important point has been buried in
the needless debate over a benchmark tax system and the execution of
the characterization exercise as a trigger for the accounting and analytical
functions associated with the tax-expenditure concept. Indeed, it is argu-
able that Bittker's original point has been lost with the passage of time
and the volume of subsequent literature on the tax-expenditure concept;
or worse, it has been misstated in its significance.
Although well intentioned, traditional defenses of the tax-expenditure
concept, grounded in the comprehensive tax base tradition, mistakenly
tend to mask the significance of the consequential attributes associated
with various rule choices as the basis for a necessary distinction between
technical tax rules and tax-expenditure provisions. 148 Although technical
tax-policy and tax-expenditure analyses both involve consideration of the
same consequential attributes, the emphasis is different, particularly
where a tax-expenditure program is chosen by the government in dis-
charging its allocative function. 149 As Shaviro suggests, tax-rule choices
that are seen as part of the technical architecture under an income tax
tend to be made with a focus on the distributional aspects, while balanc-
ing them against administrative and compliance costs and efficiency ef-
fects.150 These other consequential attributes are thus decidedly
secondary in importance. In fact, many of the features of a Haig-Simons
or comprehensive tax base are presumably preferred because of the per-
ceived distributional effects.151 Revenue is ideally raised in a distribu-
tionally appealing manner at the lowest possible administrative and
143. Brooks, supra note 114, at 235; see also Kraan, supra note 129, at 124.
144. Brooks, supra note 114, at 235.
145. Bittker, supra note 126, at 932.
146. Brooks, supra note 114, at 234.
147. See id.
148. See, e.g., Fleming & Peroni, supra note 113, at 449.
149. Id.
150. SHAVIRO, supra note 141, at 183-90; Shaviro, supra note 134, at 207-13.
151. SHAVIRO, supra note 141, at 183.
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compliance cost, with tolerable efficiency costs attributable to behavioral
response to the change in price occasioned by the particular tax rule. All
else being equal, the rule that changes behavior least should be preferred
because of its smaller deadweight loss. But as Bittker emphasized early
on, there are many rule choices that involve ambiguous distributional ef-
fects.152 In these instances, considerations of administration and compli-
ance, along with tax politics and possible behavioral response, tend to
move to the forefront of policy analysis.153
Where a tax rule is chosen as an instrument to induce a behavioral
response, the emphasis of the associated policy analysis obviously
changes. Shaviro argues, for example, that the government in this in-
stance is discharging its allocative function, and distributional effects are
decidedly secondary. 154 This altered emphasis requires policymakers to
invoke budgetary criteria in assessing the particular rule choice that is
intended to induce the behavioral response. Consequently, the analysis
of the associated efficiency effects is no longer framed in terms of dead-
weight loss. A market failure requiring government spending in the form
of the posited tax benefit must be identified, 155 and the welfare gain asso-
ciated with the intended behavioral response should be estimated and
weighed against the expected cost of providing the benefit measured as
the sum of:
* administrative costs; and
* windfall gains attributable to the delivery of benefits to economic
units that would engage in the desired behavior irrespective of the
availability of any such benefits.
This quantitative targeting feature will be a function, in part at least, of
the qualitative targeting aspects of the tax-rule choice. Over-inclusive-
ness will result in costs in the form of inframarginal gains. Under-inclu-
siveness will result in a range of economic units being excluded from the
provision of benefits even though their behavior would be affected in the
intended manner. In terms of rule choice, delivery of the program
through the tax system should be compared with alternative policy instru-
152. Bittker, supra note 126, at 948.
153. See id. at 932.
154. SHAVIRO, supra note 141, at 183-91.
155. An example of the analytical significance of different framing of the efficiency
effects attributable to different tax treatments is the consumption tax treatment of savings
for retirement, which may be justified as an instrument to correct certain cognitive biases
that otherwise result in a suboptimal level of savings. See, e.g., AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra
note 55, at 116-30. This framing, and the policy analysis that follows, is much different
than that associated with the debate over the merits of the treatment of savings generally
under a consumption versus an income tax, which centers on an assessment of the distribu-
tional and efficiency effects of the two possible treatments. Resolution of this timeless
policy debate does not depend, in any way, on positing a market failure to be corrected by
invoking a tax-based policy instrument. See, e.g., SHAVIRO, supra note 141, at 181 (noting
the objection of consumption tax advocates to the characterization of the consumption tax
treatment of savings as a tax expenditure).
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ments independent of the tax system,156 since it is not a choice among
alternative tax rules. Finally, the program itself, irrespective of the choice
of delivery mechanism, should be assessed in terms of the government's
policy and spending priorities.
The characterization of a particular rule embedded in the income tax
system as either a tax-expenditure provision or a technical tax rule can
thus be seen as contingent on its rationale. This point was emphasized
some time ago by McIntyre, who argues that the tax system does not have
to be unambiguously divided into technical tax rules and tax expendi-
tures.157 If a particular rule is, or has been, justified as a spending provi-
sion, it should be analyzed as a spending program.' 58 As a means of
conceptual reasoning, the tax-expenditure concept should be invoked
whenever a rule embedded in the tax system is intended, or can be seen
to be intended, to induce a particular behavioral response to correct a
market failure, and the government is thereby performing its allocative
function.159 Where the classification of a particular rule might otherwise
be contentious, McIntyre's classification paradigm errs on the side of a
tax-expenditure characterization on the presumption that the provision of
additional budgetary accounting information is useful, while enriching the
policy analysis can only enhance discharge of the policymaking func-
tion.160 McIntyre's approach to the articulation of the tax-expenditure
concept also embraces what are sometimes referred to as "negative tax
expenditures" as a class of rules that do not provide a tax benefit for
particular behavior but impose an additional tax or tax penalty.161 Such
provisions are commonly intended to correct a market failure by increas-
ing the cost of the targeted behavior and are nothing more than
Pigouvian corrective taxes; they should be analyzed in the same manner
as tax expenditures generally because they are intended, or can be seen to
be intended, to induce a behavioral response.
By reconsidering the justification for some selected provisions that are
commonly seen as technical tax rules, Parts IV and V illustrate the con-
tingent nature of tax-expenditure classification and analysis emphasized
by McIntyre. With moderation of excessive leverage and risk taking as
156. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 962-63 (2004) (emphasizing the relatively low delivery costs
of tax-expenditure programs).
157. Michael J. McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem ofDefining a Tax Expenditure, 14
U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 79, 82 (1980). McIntyre's argument was subsequently massaged by
Victor Thuronyi. See Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J.
1155, 1156 (1988) (proposing that a tax provision should be analyzed as a tax expenditure if
it functions as a spending program). But see Brooks, supra note 114, at 235 (arguing that a
functional approach identifies a majority of tax expenditures, but fails to do so in the case
of some significant tax rules that are so overinclusive they have no direct spending
analogue).
158. McIntyre, supra note 157, at 100.
159. See id. at 101.
160. See id.
161. See, e.g., JCT, RECONSIDERATION, supra note 131, at 9 (labelling as a "negative tax
subsidy" any provision that deliberately overtaxes as compared to the general rule).
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the policy goal, it is suggested that some provisions can be framed as tax
subsidies while others can be framed as corrective taxes. More particu-
larly, tax-expenditure analysis moves the assessment away from a focus
on consistency of tax treatment along the relevant behavioral margins to
a focus on inconsistency as a means to bias behavior. Many provisions
that are conventionally characterized as part of the technical tax structure
can be characterized as tax expenditures intended to induce particular
behavioral responses in the presence of market failure, with much the
same result in terms of rule choice supported by familiar technical tax-
policy arguments. These arguments are especially important given that a
tax-expenditure characterization of various rule choices highlights a sig-
nificant targeting problem: an inability to precisely calibrate the required
amount of any tax subsidy or corrective tax. Taxation, however, clearly
plays a secondary role to the use of regulatory instruments on the supply
side of capital markets as a means to moderate excessive leverage and
risk-taking. This secondary role may mean that the quantitative targeting
dimension is not as severe as it would be if a tax-based instrument were
chosen as the principal instrument. 162 Moreover, much of the qualitative
targeting dimension can be adequately executed. At a minimum, many of
the practical considerations that have been seen to justify the particular
tax-rule choices receive some enhancement from the application of tax-
expenditure analysis.
At the price of some confusion, therefore, the following two Parts slide
back and forth between technical tax-policy analysis and tax-expenditure
analysis in assessing tax-rule choices for the treatment of: (1) returns to
corporate debt and equity, (2) losses, and (3) interest expense of individu-
als. It is hoped that this admittedly confusing mode of analysis illustrates
the need for flexibility in the use of both sets of policy tools in areas
where the line between technical tax rules and tax-expenditure provisions
is somewhat blurred.
IV. DIVIDEND IMPUTATION SYSTEMS, CORPORATE
CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AND MARGINS OF SAFETY
In the context of an explicit policy goal of moderation of financial in-
stability, the tax-policy literature highlights a tax bias in favor of corpo-
rate debt, which is characteristic of most corporate income tax systems, as
the most significant tax distortion requiring reform. 163 Moving from a
conventional micro to a macro focus, this tax bias is seen to induce an
excessive level of debt in the corporate sector generally, which leaves it
vulnerable to economic downturns. 164 A tax-rule choice that realizes
162. See, e.g., Slemrod, supra note 5, at 389 (suggesting that some insight may be gained
from applying the economics of Pigouvian taxes to systemic financial risk); see also Shack-
elford, Shaviro & Slemrod, supra note 5, at 10-15 (emphasizing the difficulties in the de-
sign of Pigouvian taxes as a means to address systemic risk in the financial sector).
163. See, e.g., IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 5-12; see also supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
164. IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 12-13.
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complete consistency of treatment of returns to debt and equity finance
would eliminate this instability-breeding bias. Depending on the particu-
lar parameters, a tax-rule choice that realizes something less than com-
plete consistency of these same returns would mute, but not eliminate,
the same bias. In an effort to realize complete consistency of tax treat-
ment, the IMF paper, for example, advocates adoption of an allowance
for corporate equity (ACE) system1 65 as a preferred reform option; it is
reluctant, however, to go further and recommend use of a tax penalty for
debt finance, presumably because of the difficulty determining the appro-
priate level of such a penalty that would force firms to internalize the
negative spillover effects associated with excessive leverage. By eliminat-
ing the tax bias for debt financing, it is apparently assumed that a range of
otherwise suboptimal investments will be forgone, with a reduction in the
level of corporate leverage as an important secondary benefit. It is also
apparently assumed that elimination of a tax bias in favor of corporate
debt will induce a range of corporations to maintain stable hedge-finance
states.
In advocating a strong form of consistent tax treatment, the IMF paper
ignores some important policy constraints associated with the presence of
tax exempts and nonresident investors. These constraints mean that real-
ization of consistent treatment for the entire range of investors is unreal-
istic, leaving a compromised application of dividend imputation systems
as the preferred alternative to the double taxation of equity returns under
classical corporate income tax systems. This compromised application
manifests itself in two principal respects:
* maintenance of a debt tax bias for tax-exempt and nonresident in-
vestors; and
* provision of an equity tax bias for a range of taxable investors.
This Part suggests that the latter can be framed as a tax-expenditure
program intended to promote maintenance of margins of safety. But this
bias must be supported with a comprehensive deductibility limitation for
corporate interest expense, which is the necessary tax penalty analogous
to a corrective tax for debt finance under dividend imputation systems
with incomplete consistency of taxation of debt and equity returns as a
persistent feature in the presence of tax-exempt and nonresident
investors.
A. INCONSISTENT TAXATION OF DEBT AND EQUITY RETURNS AND
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CORPORATE/INVESTOR
RATE RELATIONSHIPS
Standard country practice permits the accrual-based deduction of cor-
porate interest expense while requiring the inclusion of interest income
165. The ACE system was originally proposed in a study sponsored by the UK Institute
for Fiscal Studies. See INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, EQUITY FOR COMPANIES: A COR-
PORATION TAX FOR THE 1990s 2 (1991).
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by debtholders on the same basis. 166 Dividends are non-deductible for
issuers and are taxable to shareholders, with or without credit for corpo-
rate tax paid on the underlying income. 167 Taking this different treatment
as a given, the IMF paper provides a succinct review of the rate relation-
ships that are the source of a tax bias in favor of debt for a range of
investors.168 In fact, the parameters of these relationships are the subject
of a deep corporate finance literature1 69 on the theory of an optimal capi-
tal structure, which lowers the after-tax cost of capital and maximizes
shareholder wealth through the judicious use of debt. This literature be-
gins with the work of Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller (MM) and
their fundamental insight stated in the form of the following proposition:
In the absence of taxes, the value of a corporation is independent of its
capital structure, and corporate debt policy is irrelevant. 170 Their irrele-
vance proposition follows from two simple premises: first, that the value
of a corporation is equal to the present value of the expected cash flows
from its assets; and second, that the relative mix of debt and equity secur-
ities divides those expected cash flows among investors.171 Accordingly,
the sum of the present value of the expected cash flows associated with
the outstanding debt and equity securities of a corporation must equal the
present value of the expected cash flows associated with the underlying
corporate assets.172 Critical to this proposition is a requirement of per-
fect capital markets (for example, the absence of information asymme-
tries) and a resultant insensitivity as between the investment policy of a
corporation and its borrowing policy. 173 Under those conditions, the
value of two corporations with the same asset profile must be equivalent,
whatever their mix of debt and equity securities. This equivalence holds
because any alteration of the risk and return mix realized by an alteration
of the relative mix of corporate-level debt and equity can be replicated by
investors through the substitution of investor-level debt for corporate-
level debt. Investors will not pay a premium for shares of corporations
with capital structures that have a mix of debt and equity, since any
changes in the mix of corporate-level debt and equity securities are only
166. See IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 5.
167. An exemption for inter-corporate dividends ensures that there is only one level of
corporate income tax on equity earnings.
168. IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 5-8.
169. For accessible surveys of this literature, see Murray Z. Frank & Vidhan K. Goyal,
Trade-off and Pecking Order Theories of Debt, in 2 HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL CORPO-
RATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 135 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2008); John R.
Graham, Taxes and Corporate Finance: A Review, 16 REV. FIN. STUD. 1075 (2005); Milton
Harris & Artur Raviv, The Theory of Capital Structure, 46 J. FIN. 297, 297 (1991).
170. Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Reply to Heins and Sprenkle, 59 AM.
ECON. REV. 592, 592 (1969); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 268-69 (1958)
[hereinafter Modigliani & Miller, Cost of Capital].
171. Modigliani & Miller, Cost of Capital, supra note 170, at 262.
172. Id.
173. There must also be no additional transaction costs associated with personal bor-
rowing as a substitute for corporate borrowing. Id.
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changes in portfolio composition.17 4
As emphasized by MM, the introduction of taxes alters their analysis,
primarily because of a tax bias in favor of corporate debt, which can be
used to lower the after-tax cost of capital.' 75 In particular, the deductibil-
ity of interest expense permits the distribution of corporate income free
of the corporate-level tax.176 Because of this shield from the corporate
income tax provided by the interest expense deduction, corporate debt
generates an increased after-tax return and lower cost of capital; in an
important sense, the tax shield is an asset that adds value to a corporation
and induces the issue of more debt than would otherwise occur in a world
without taxes.' 77 An extensive literature178 is important, however, for its
emphasis on the more complex rate relationships that determine whether,
in the aggregate, there is: (1) a tax bias in favor of debt or equity, and (2)
an optimal capital structure for particular corporations. In general, the
focus of this literature is the expansion of the original MM analysis to
account for the effect of investor-level taxes on debt and equity returns,
as well as the impact of different effective corporate tax rates. 79 To some
extent, these additional factors operate to reduce, offset, or both reduce
and offset the present value of the tax shield from the corporate interest
deduction, which reduces the tax bias in favor of debt. But even after
accounting for differences in corporate and investor-level tax rates, there
remains a general tax bias in favor of debt which arises largely because
the investor-level tax on interest income is less than the two levels of tax
on equity income for a range of investors. 80 The present value of the tax
shield provided by the corporate interest deduction is sufficient, there-
fore, to induce corporations to issue more debt than they would in the
absence of income taxes. The equilibrium point at which the present
value of the tax shield equals the tax rate of the marginal investor is, in a
general sense, drawn at a point that indicates a tax preference for corpo-
rate debt for a range of investors.
174. A necessary implication of the irrelevance of corporate debt policy is the notion
that the expected return on the shares of a leveraged corporation increases in proportion
to the debt-equity ratio. The increase in expected return occurs as an offset to the increase
in risk borne by the shareholders of a leveraged corporation. Because the presence of
corporate debt does not affect the expected operating income of the corporation or the
total market value of its securities, the presence of borrowing does not affect the expected
return on the underlying assets. All that is affected is the division of that return among
investors.
175. Merton H. Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261, 262 (1977).
176. Id. at 266.
177. Id.
178. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy, and the Cost of Capi-
tal, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 6 (1973); see also Graham, supra note 169, at 1077-1104 (surveying
the extensive empirical literature on the relationship between taxes and corporate financial
structure).
179. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Slemrod, supra note 5, at 388 (observing that the presence of tax-exempt
investors means that an overall preference for corporate debt finance "almost certainly
prevails").
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As explanations of this equilibrium, the trade-off and agency theories
of corporate capital structure posit that debt is issued to the point that
direct and indirect costs of financial distress are equal to or less than the
value of the associated tax shield.18 1 In effect, the tax advantage associ-
ated with the deductibility of corporate interest expense induces a substi-
tution of debt for equity to the point that the instruments are no longer
perfect substitutes, and the substitution is considered inefficient because
of the related nontax costs-both direct and indirect. Direct costs consist
of the administrative and legal costs incurred in bankruptcy or a compa-
rable legal proceeding that is invoked as the mechanism governing the
orderly breakup or reorganization of an insolvent corporation. 182 Indi-
rect costs consist of the more intangible costs associated with difficulties
encountered in the operation of a corporation as a going concern or in
financial distress short of bankruptcy proceedings.183 These costs include
the inefficiencies associated with asset substitution and underinvestment,
which occur because of shareholders' decisions to pursue risky invest-
ments with zero or negative present values, as well as their decisions to
forgo investments that would otherwise add value to a corporation. 184
In an attempt to prevent potential gaming by shareholders, creditors
typically require restrictions and covenants limiting actions that might be
detrimental to the value of the issued debt. Negotiation of these more
complex contracts involves legal and administrative costs, along with
monitoring costs incurred to ensure that the specified restrictions are ob-
served. In this respect, Minsky's financial instability hypothesis posits
that the necessary calibration of the nontax costs associated with debt
financing fails during a period of prolonged prosperity, with a range of
borrowers and their lenders overstating the adequacy of margins of safety
as they move from hedge finance to speculative or Ponzi finance states. 1 5
With understatement of the associated nontax costs of debt finance, a tax
bias for corporate interest expense is problematic as a further impetus to
181. See sources cited supra note 169. But see Roger H. Gordon, Taxation and Corpo-
rate Use of Debt: Implications for Tax Policy, 63 NAT'L TAX J. 151 (2010) (reviewing the
literature on capital structure theory and characterizing the market for corporate debt as
presenting a classic lemons problem, which explains the under-use of corporate debt given
the prevailing tax bias).
182. The direct costs of financial distress attributable to bankruptcy proceedings are
relatively easy to quantify; however, as most studies have concluded, such costs are rela-
tively insignificant when measured as a percentage of asset value. For a pioneering study
of bankruptcy costs as a percentage of asset value, see Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs:
Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337, 343 (1977) (examining eleven railroad bankruptcies in the
United States and finding that, on average, the costs were only 5.3% of the value of all
outstanding debt and equity of the corporations immediately before bankruptcy and only
1.4% five years before bankruptcy). But see Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Inves-
tigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1067 (1984) (finding that bank-
ruptcy costs are not trivial).
183. See Warner, supra note 182, at 338.
184. See Altman, supra note 182, at 1071.
185. See, e.g., Geanakoplos, supra note 95, at 20 (observing that managers of borrowing
funds do not typically fully internalize the costs of bankruptcy to society, including sys-
temic risk attributable to falling asset prices in a debt deflationary environment).
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excessive risk taking.186 Although it is now recognized that excessive lev-
erage can be seen as a negative externality at a macro level,'87 the focus
of the tax-policy literature has been the firm-level distortion of invest-
ment that arises because of the negative cost of capital attributable to the
combination of the corporate interest expense deduction and accelerated
depreciation. In this tax environment, investments that are not profitable
in the absence of taxes become profitable because of the tax system.
As noted above, the ACE system is preferred in the IMF paper as one
particular approach that realizes consistency of treatment of the returns
on corporate debt and equity and thereby equalizes the after-tax cost of
both forms of capital.s88 Under the ACE system, the corporate interest
expense deduction is maintained, and a normal return is imputed on eq-
uity for deductibility purposes.189 This return, as well as interest income,
is exempt for holders; any return in excess of the normal rate is subject to
tax at both the corporate and shareholder levels.190 The ACE system is
thus a nondistortive tax on economic rents, with consumption tax treat-
ment of normal returns.191 But as acknowledged in the IMF paper, there
is only limited country experience with the ACE system,'192 which
presents some difficult technical issues, including transitional problems
and inconsistency with the different premises of the international tax sta-
tus quo.193 Perhaps most importantly, the extension of interest imputa-
186. But see Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduc-
tion Discourages Innovation and Risk-Taking, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1461, 1465-66 (1993) (argu-
ing that the corporate interest deduction favors relatively safe projects involving the
acquisition of tangible assets such as real estate and equipment as well as mature corpora-
tions with established credit records).
187. See IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 10; see also Slemrod, supra note 5,
at 388 (noting the failure of public finance economists to account for spillover effects at-
tributable to excessive leverage).
188. IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 14.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Edward Kleinbard's business enterprise income tax (BEIT) also entails a deduc-
tion for an imputed cost of corporate capital-both equity and debt-equal to a normal
rate, but with taxation at the investor level on an accrual basis. EDWARD D. KLEINBARD,
REHABILITATING THE BUSINESS INCOME TAX 10 (2007). The BEIT is thus consistent with
an income tax imposed on the normal rate of return to both debt and equity capital. Id.
Returns in excess of the normal rate would be taxed in a manner broadly similar to the
ACE system. See id. at 38 n.41; Edward D. Kleinbard, Designing an Income Tax on Capi-
tal, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 165, 178-79 (Henry J. Aaron, Leonard E. Burman & C.
Eugene Steuerle eds., 2007).
192. See Michael Keen & John King, The Croatian Profit Tax: An ACE in Practice, 23
FISCAL STUD. 401, 401 (2002); Alexander Klemm, Allowances for Corporate Equity in
Practice, 53 CESIFo EcoN. STUD. 229, 229-30 (2007); see also IMF, Crisis-Related Issues,
supra note 5, at 14-15 (noting that adoption of an ACE system in Croatia may have re-
duced corporate income tax revenues by one-third, while the Fiscal Affairs Division of the
IMF estimates that a revenue reduction of approximately one percentage point of gross
domestic product has been experienced elsewhere).
193. See, e.g., John Isaac, A Comment on the Viability of the Allowance for Corporate
Equity, 18 FISCAL STUD. 303, 304-05 (1997). There is no country experience with the
BEIT system, which suffers from many of the same problems. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr.,
The Business Enterprise Income Tax: A First Appraisal, 118 TAX NOTEs 921, 921 (2008).
But see Edward D. Kleinbard, BEIT Proponent Kleinbard Responds to Warren's Critique,
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tion to equity capital for deductibility purposes entails revenue loss,
primarily because of the presence of tax-exempt and nonresident inves-
tors.1 9 4 This revenue loss has tended to make the ACE system impracti-
cal in the presence of a budget constraint.
Denial of the corporate interest expense deduction is an obvious tax-
reform alternative which attempts to realize consistency of treatment of
returns to debt and equity while moderating revenue effects. This ap-
proach is developed most completely in the 1992 study by the U.S. De-
partment of the Treasury proposing a comprehensive business income tax
(CBIT).1 95 For various reasons, including its taxation of debt returns to
tax exempts, the CBIT system is also problematic. 196 The Nordic dual
income taxes (DITs), which are probably the closest operationalization of
a CBIT system, attempt to manage some of these problems by maintain-
ing the corporate interest expense deduction and applying the corporate
income tax on equity income either as a final tax (exemption at the share-
holder level) or as a withholding tax (dividend imputation approach).197
In fact, as a particular expression of a CBIT system, the Nordic DITs
have received considerable support in the tax-policy literature.198 Much
of their attractiveness lies, however, in the application of a single rate to
118 TAX NOTES 1043, 1044-45 (2008); Daniel N. Shaviro, Why the BEIT Proposal
Shouldn't Be Discounted, 118 TAX NOTEs 1048, 1048 (2008).
194. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Reconsidering the Accrual of Interest Income, 78
TAXES 36, 43-44 (2000) (emphasizing the net revenue loss from a comprehensive, accrual-
based deduction/inclusion system in the presence of tax-exempt investors). New Zealand
is the only OECD country without any form of consumption tax treatment for retirement
savings. See Lisa Marriott, Taxation of Retirement Savings: New Zealand-The Extreme
Experiment, 22 AUSTL. TAX F. 93, 94-95 (2007).
195. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
ON THE INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOME TAX SYSTEMS: TAX-
ING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 39-60 (1992). Interest and dividends both would be nonde-
ductible at the corporate level and would be exempt from investor-level taxation. Id. at 39.
For a comparison of possible welfare effects under the ACE and CBIT systems, see gener-
ally Doina Maria Radulescu & Michael Stimmelmayr, ACE versus CBIT: Which is Better
for Investment and Welfare?, 53 CESIwo ECON. STUD. 294 (2007). See also Ruud A. de
Mooij & Michael P. Devereux, Alternative Systems of Business Tax in Europe: An Applied
Analysis of ACE and CBIT Reforms (European Commission, Taxation Paper No. 17,
2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxationcustoms/resources/documents/taxation/
gen-info/economic-analysis/tax-papers/taxation-paper 17_en.pdf.
196. See IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 13-14 (noting the transitional diffi-
culties presented by a CBIT system in dealing with pre-existing debt as well as the possible
denial of foreign tax credits and the need for a specialized regime for banks). Taxation of
the same returns at higher rates for nonresidents means that the tax is unlikely to be credit-
able by those capital-exporting countries with foreign tax credit systems for foreign-source
income. The recent move by Japan and the United Kingdom to an exemption system for
business income from outbound direct investment leaves the United States as the only
major capital exporter operating a foreign tax credit system. See ARTHUR J. COCKFIELD,
ADVISORY PANEL ON CANADA'S SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, EXAMINING
POLICY OPInONS FOR THE TAXATION OF OUTBOUND DIRECT INVESTMENT 22, 24, 26
(2008).
197. Peter Birch Sorensen, The Nordic Dual Income Tax: Principles, Practices, and Rel-
evance for Canada, 55 CAN. TAX J. 557, 562 (2007).
198. For a recent and comprehensive account of the Nordic DITs as an option for re-
form, see generally Sorensen, supra note 197; see also Edward D. Kleinbard, An American
Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents, 5 Nw. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 41 (2010).
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all forms of capital income, which permits the use of an interest-withhold-
ing tax on deductible interest expense. 199 The benefits of this single-rate
structure are largely forgone where exceptions must be made for tax-ex-
empt and nonresident investors, with a zero rate applied to their interest
income returns and the single rate for capital income applied to equity
returns through nonrefundability of dividend imputation credits. Where
these features are maintained, much of the attractiveness of a DIT system
is undermined, and it tends to converge with existing dividend imputation
systems in its realization of an incomplete consistency of taxation of debt
and equity returns.
It is suggested below in Part IV.B that this incomplete consistency of
treatment of the returns to corporate debt and equity, which is character-
istic of most dividend imputation systems, can be seen as a preferred tax-
rule choice when policymakers move from the standard micro focus that
has informed tax-policy analysis to a tax-expenditure perspective focused
on excessive leverage at a macro level. In short, what is commonly
viewed as a weakness of dividend imputation systems, but a necessary
concession to revenue, administration, and compliance considerations,
looks much different when viewed in this different policy light. It may
even be appropriate to provide a preferential tax rate for share gains as a
means to support a retention bias.
B. INCOMPLETE CONSISTENCY UNDER DIVIDEND IMPUTATION
SYSTEMS AND MAINTENANCE OF MARGINS OF SAFETY
Dividend imputation systems ideally ensure that only the shareholder-
level tax is ultimately paid on distributed equity income, and the tax sys-
tem is consistent in its treatment of the returns to debt and equity. This
condition holds provided that the corporate income tax rate and the high-
est marginal personal income tax rate are equivalent, and shareholders
receive full imputation credits for corporate tax on the underlying income
from which dividends are paid. Under these strict parameters, a dividend
imputation system ensures that the corporate income tax operates as a
withholding tax on equity income, and there is no preference for debt or
equity finance. 200 To varying degrees and for various reasons, however,
199. Neil Brooks, An Overview of the Role of the VAT, Fundamental Tax Reform, and a
Defence of the Income Tax, in GST IN RETROSPECT AND PROSPEcr 597, 646-48 (Richard
Krever & David White eds., 2007).
200. The "old view" of dividend taxation holds that the tax cost associated with divi-
dend payments is traded off against nontax benefits, such as their signaling function and
constraint on managerial discretion. SHAVIRO, supra note 19, at 73. In contrast with the
"old view" of dividend taxation, the "new view" holds that, under specified conditions, the
timing of dividend payments is irrelevant and there is no deferral benefit associated with
retention of earnings. Id. at 74. One of the specified conditions is, however, equivalence
of corporate and personal income tax rates. Id. at 72. Where the latter exceeds the former,
there is a tax benefit to deferring dividend distributions. See id. at 73-88 (reviewing the old
and new view of dividend taxation, including the empirical literature attempting to deter-
mine which view has greater explanatory power); see also Graham, supra note 169, at
1104-11 (surveying the extensive empirical literature exploring the relationship between
taxes and dividend payout policy).
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national tax policymakers have failed to realize complete consistency of
the returns to equity and debt for a range of investors. Although the
policy pieces tend to be seen as the result of discrete technical tax-policy
considerations, it is suggested here that the ostensibly incoherent whole
can be rationalized as a tax-expenditure program intended to promote
maintenance of margins of safety in the corporate sector.
The IMF paper does not discuss dividend imputation systems in any
detail, 201 presumably because of certain structural features that combine
to undermine consistency of treatment of debt and equity returns. Three
important features with this effect are:
* limitation of imputation credits to taxable resident shareholders of
domestic corporations;
* provision of unfunded imputation credits computed as a function of
statutory corporate income tax rates rather than effective rates; and
* adoption of a statutory corporate income tax rate that is lower than
the highest marginal personal income tax rate.
For a range of taxable investors, each of these features lowers the tax
rate on equity income and provides a preference for such investment over
debt. Although this equity bias tends to be accepted by national tax
policymakers as the tolerable outcome of structural compromises, 202 it
may also be justified on tax-expenditure grounds. As an illustrative ex-
ample of this kind of policy flexibility, limitation of the Canadian divi-
dend tax credit (DTC) to resident individuals holding shares of "taxable
Canadian corporations" 2 0 3 has sometimes been justified on technical tax-
policy grounds and sometimes on the basis of two related subsidy ratio-
nales.204 One subsidy rationale posits that the DTC is provided as a nec-
201. See generally IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5. For a general description of
dividend imputation systems in some selected countries, see HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J.
ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION 405-09 (3d ed. 2010). Australia and New
Zealand operate full imputation systems whereby credit is provided only to the extent of
corporate tax paid on the underlying income. See id.
202. See, e.g., Fookes, supra note 134, at 18 ("Double taxation provisions would not be
reported [that is, as tax expenditures] as they seek to align effective tax rates between
different tax structures. For instance imputation credits align tax on investment income
with personal tax rates. This is not motivated by any alternative policy goal.").
203. See Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. 1 pt. 1, § 89(1) (Can.) (defining a "taxable
Canadian corporation" as a corporation that is incorporated in Canada and not statutorily
exempt from income tax).
204. See Tim Edgar, Integration Canadian Style: Comments on the Dividend Tax Credit
and the Recommendation of the Ontario Fair Tax Commission, 9 TAX NoTEs INT'L 1231,
1237-38 (1994). For a complete historical account of the DTC, see Neil Brooks, Taxation
of Closely-Held Corporations: The Partnership Option and the Lower Rate of Tax, 3 AusmT.
TAX F. 381, 417-41 (1986). In the federal government's 1979, 1980, and 1981 tax-expendi-
ture accounts, the DTC was characterized and accounted for as a tax expenditure. Edgar,
supra, at 1236. In the 1985, 1992, and 1993 tax-expenditure accounts, this practice was
changed, and the DTC was characterized as a partial integration mechanism, although its
value as a tax expenditure was included as a memorandum item. Id. Subsequent tax ex-
penditure accounts are consistent with a characterization of the DTC as a technical tax
provision. Id. But see Robin Boadway, The Annual Tax Expenditure Account-A Cri-
tique, 55 CAN. TAX J. 106, 125 (2007) (suggesting that the DTC warrants classification as a
tax expenditure because it does not accomplish the technical tax policy goal of avoidance
of double taxation).
1005
SMU LAW REVIEW
essary stimulus for investment in Canadian corporations. 205 Proponents
of this view apparently believe that, by reducing the burden of the double
taxation of corporate income, the DTC should lead to increased equity
investment in the Canadian corporate sector.206 This result is presumably
achieved through an increase in the after-tax return on dividend income,
which is assumed to translate into increased savings, a lower cost of capi-
tal, and increased growth.207 A related subsidy rationale posits that the
DTC is provided to encourage Canadian share ownership. 208 This result
presumably occurs because of the reduction in personal income tax pro-
vided by the DTC, which serves as an incentive for resident individuals to
purchase shares of Canadian corporations, with assumed spillover bene-
fits. 2 0 9 Yet this very same feature of the DTC-limitation to resident in-
dividuals holding shares of taxable Canadian corporations-has also been
justified as a technical design feature.210 In particular, the unavailability
of the DTC for tax exempts and nonresidents is sometimes supported on
the basis of the prohibitive revenue cost of extending the credit on a re-
fundable basis to these shareholders. 21' Similarly, provision of divi-
dend-imputation credits on an unfunded basis-provision on an assumed
amount of corporate tax paid as a function of the statutory rate-has also
been justified on technical tax-policy grounds, such as administrative sim-
plicity; or, alternatively, as a means of allowing the benefit of corporate
losses and tax incentives to be passed on to shareholders as a tax subsidy,
with the lower effective tax rate reflected in an assumed lower cost of
equity capital. 212
Consistent with these other compromised features of dividend imputa-
tion systems, adoption of a statutory corporate tax rate that is lower than
the highest marginal personal rate may also be rationalized as the out-
205. Edgar, supra note 204, at 1238.
206. Id.
207. The DTC was enhanced for resident individuals owning shares of publicly-traded
Canadian corporations as a response intended to suppress demand for the income-trust
structure and its associated debt-equity substitution. See Press Release, Dep't of Fin. Can.,
Minister of Finance Acts on Income Trust Issue (Nov. 23, 2005), available at http://www.
fin.gc.ca/n05/05-082-eng.asp. The proposal was implemented in legislation effective for
dividends paid after 2005. See Tim Edgar, Canadian Income Trust Saga: Over, or Headed
for a Junk Bond Phase?, 45 TAX NoTEs INT'L 755, 755 (2007). Revenue cost apparently
necessitated continued denial of the DTC for tax-exempts with the result that enhance-
ment of the DTC did not suppress demand for the income-trust structure from this tax
clientele. Id. A subsequent legislative response was required to completely shut down the
income-trust structure. See id. For a discussion of a system of full integration as a systemic
response intended to eliminate the income trust market, see generally Lalit Aggarwal &
Jack Mintz, Income Trusts and Shareholder Taxation: Getting It Right, 52 CAN. TAX J. 792
(2004); Jack M. Mintz & Stephen R. Richardson, Income Trusts and Integration of Business
and Investor Taxes: A Policy Analysis and Proposal, 54 CAN. TAX J. 359 (2006).
208. Edgar, supra note 204, at 1238.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1238-39.
211. See, e.g., Mintz & Richardson, supra note 207, at 392-94 (estimating annual reve-
nue loss of $2.6 billion from the provision of a refundable DTC for tax exempts in
Canada).
212. Edgar, supra note 204, at 1240-41.
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come of technical tax-policy considerations or as a tax-expenditure provi-
sion. With respect to the former rationale, competition for mobile direct
investment has placed considerable downward pressure on corporate tax
rates. The result of this trend is that the statutory rate in many countries
is lower than the shareholder-level tax rate for a range of investors. This
rate gap provides the benefit of deferral through the retention of equity
income at the corporate level.2 13 As a function of tax competition, the
gap is commonly seen as a technical design issue,214 and, given an inabil-
ity to stem pressure on the corporate tax rate, some reformers argue that
it should be closed though a combination of base-broadening measures
under the personal income tax and a lowering of the highest personal
marginal rate.215 But the rate gap can be framed instead in terms of a
tax-expenditure rationale that is especially important for the promotion
of maintenance of margins of safety. Again, the Canadian experience is
instructive.
A lower statutory corporate tax rate has long been provided on a
targeted basis for Canadian-controlled private corporations (CCPCs) on
a specified maximum amount of annual income from an active business
carried on in Canada. 216 This lower rate of corporate tax, and the reten-
tion bias it entails where the shareholder tax rate is higher, has sometimes
been justified as a technical tax-policy provision intended to realize con-
sistency of tax treatment between closely held corporations and the unin-
corporated sector with which such corporations are seen to compete. 217
The same lower rate of corporate tax has also been justified, however, as
a tax subsidy that is intended either:
* to correct for an equity capital market bias faced by closely held
corporations that are small to medium in size;218 or
* to capture perceived spillover benefits associated with this sector.219
213. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
214. See George R. Zodrow, Corporate Income Taxation in Canada, 56 CAN. TAX J.
392, 452 (2008).
215. See, e.g., John G. Head & Richard Krever, Australian Business Income Tax Reform
in Retrospect: An Analytical Perspective, in AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS TAX REFORM IN RET-
ROSPECT AND PROSPEcr 17 (Chris Evans & Richard Krever eds., 2009).
216. Income Tax Act R.S.C., c. 1 pt. 1, (5th Supp.) § 125 (1985) (Can.). The specified
maximum is currently $500,000, with this amount shared by "associated" CCPCs. For a
complete account of the history of this lower rate of corporate tax, see Brooks, supra note
204, at 437-50.
217. See Boadway, supra note 204, at 126 (suggesting that the low rate of corporate tax
for CCPCs may be characterized as part of the benchmark rate structure intended to en-
sure comparable treatment of incorporated and unincorporated small businesses).
218. See Brooks, supra note 204, at 482-85; Claire Crawford & Judith Freedman, Small
Business Taxation: A Special Study of the Structural Issues Surrounding the Taxation of
Business Profits of Owner Managed Firms, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX DESIGN: THE MIR-
RLEEs REVIEW 1028,1069-71 (J. Mirrlees et al. eds., 2009); William McCarten, Evaluating
the Costs and Benefits of the Federal Small Business Deduction: A Framework for Tax Ex-
penditure Evaluation (Aug. 21, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
CCPCs with taxable capital employed in Canada in excess of $15 million lose the benefit of
the lower rate. See Income Tax Act R.S.C., c. 1 pt. 1, (5th Supp.) § 125(5.1) (1985) (Can.).
219. See Brooks, supra note 204, at 483, 485-87.
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Since it extends equally to the income of widely held corporations and
the income of closely held corporations subject to the same general cor-
porate rate, the retention bias that is the result of downward pressure on
statutory corporate tax rates from international tax competition is obvi-
ously much broader in its effect. Any tax-expenditure rationale probably
must change, therefore, from an attempt to correct for equity-capital mar-
ket biases, or to capture spillover benefits, to a perceived need to pro-
mote maintenance of margins of safety at the corporate level generally.
In the context of closely held corporations, a significant offsetting effect is
a distributional one, with higher-income individuals benefiting dispropor-
tionately from the deferral benefit associated with the lower rate. In the
context of widely held corporations, an offsetting effect is perceived
agency costs arising in the form of managerial "cash burning."220 In other
words, efficiency losses can result because earnings retention may be pre-
ferred for tax purposes even though, for nontax purposes, investors
would be better off receiving the earnings in the form of dividends and
reinvesting the after-tax amount in projects with greater expected re-
turns.221 The distributional effect can be addressed, in the worst in-
stances at least, by imposing a refundable tax approximating the highest
marginal personal rate on retained income that is not reinvested in an
active business.222 The agency-cost effect may be addressed through cor-
porate governance innovations-both regulatory and market based.223 It
220. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Manage-
rial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 333-34, 337-40,
342 (1976).
221. The apparent need to control agency costs attributable to corporate management's
control of excess cash flow is a specific application of the generalized argument for elimina-
tion of a perceived tax bias in favor of retention of earnings under a classical corporate
income tax. In particular, the nontax significance of the signalling function served by divi-
dend payments is the focus of a substantial literature on the desirability of consistency of
tax treatment of distributed and retained earnings. For a review of some of this literature,
see Kim Brooks, Learning To Live with an Imperfect Tax: A Defence of the Corporate Tax,
36 U. BRIT, COLUM. L. REV. 621, 659-63 (2003). Agency costs are emphasized in some of
the literature as a political explanation for the durability of the double tax on equity in-
come. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation,
105 YALE L.J. 325, 326-28, 335-36, 346 (1995). But see Michael Doran, Managers, Share-
holders, and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517, 521-24 (2009) (emphasizing
heterogeneity of interests of shareholders, corporate managers, and third parties in the
debate over the desirability of corporate integration and different methods of integration).
222. See Income Tax Act R.S.C., c. 1, pt. 1, (5th Supp.) § 129 (1985) (Can.). Much the
same problem arises under the Nordic DITs. The lower rate on capital income means that
an imputed return on equity capital must be determined for small businesses, both incorpo-
rated and unincorporated, which combine the capital and labor inputs of the participants.
In effect, the imputed return operates as an upper limit that attempts to limit the ability to
disguise labor returns as capital income. The Canadian corporate tax system for closely
held corporations permits returns to labor to be taxed at the lower corporate rate equally
with returns to financial capital up to the annual business limit for active business income.
223. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 220, at 337-39 (emphasizing the use of
debt to reduce free cash flow otherwise available to managers where monitoring is costly
and imperfect); see also Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, 67 HARV.
Bus. REV. 61, 66-67 (1989) (defending the use of high-yield debt in leveraged buyouts in
the 1980s). For a reprise of this argument in the context of the high-yield, subordinated
junk debt used in income-trust structures in Canada, see Benjamin Alarie & Edward M.
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is nonetheless unclear whether these offsetting effects can be sufficiently
muted to warrant provision of a retention bias as a means of promoting
maintenance of margins of safety and a hedge finance state at the firm
level. Because acceptance of a corporate/shareholder rate gap may be
the more broadly effective tax-rule choice to realize this goal, these off-
setting effects are especially significant.
By lowering the cost of equity capital and inducing the issue of new
equity capital, the provision of dividend imputation credits for resident
shareholders on an unfunded basis may also be rationalized as an attempt
to promote maintenance of margins of safety rather than increased do-
mestic ownership of the domestic corporate sector or increased output by
that sector. Whatever the particular subsidy rationale, the desired effect
may be substantially diluted where national capital markets are well-inte-
grated with international capital markets and are relatively small in the
sense that the domestic savings rate has virtually no impact on world in-
terest rates.224 These conditions mean that the cost of finance for a range
of domestic corporations is determined by international capital markets
independent of the level of domestic savings. As a result, any increase in
the level of domestic savings because of personal income tax reductions
may simply result in a reduction in the level of foreign savings invested in
domestic corporations or an increase in the level of domestic savings in-
vested in foreign assets. The dominant effect of a limitation of dividend
imputation credits to resident investors may thus be a portfolio shift by
residents away from debt and into shares of domestic corporations, with
nonresidents shifting away from shares of the same corporations. Any
stabilizing effect at the corporate level would be realized at the cost of an
offsetting assumption of additional risk by households, while providing
dubious spillover benefits associated with "national" share ownership. 225
These kinds of offsetting portfolio shifts would arguably occur most read-
ily with large multinational corporations whose shares trade internation-
ally. Viewed in the best possible subsidy light, therefore, limitation of
dividend imputation credits to resident individuals may help to reduce
equity capital market biases for small and medium-sized domestic corpo-
rations that are closely held. For those corporations, dividend imputation
can actually result in an increase in the total amount of their equity capi-
tal2 2 6 and, through a consequent reduction in their reliance on debt fi-
lacobucci, Tax Policy, Capital Structure, and Income Trusts, 45 CAN. Bus. L.J. 1, 4, 6-8
(2007).
224. See ONTARIO FAIR TAX COMM'N, FAIR TAXATION IN A CHANGING WORLD 343
(1993) (recommending restructuring or repeal of the provincial portion of the DTC in the
face of increasing integration of capital markets); see also Robin Boadway & Neil Bruce,
Problems with Integrating Corporate and Personal Income Taxes in an Open Economy, 48
J. PUB. ECON. 39, 40-41, 52, 54, 61-62 (1992).
225. See Glenn P. Jenkins, The Role and Economic Implications of the Canadian Divi-
dend Tax Credit, at v (Econ. Council of Can., Discussion Paper No. 307, 1986) (estimating
that the suboptimal allocation of investment portfolios caused by the DTC imposes an
annual economic cost of $500 million).
226. See Kenneth J. McKenzie, Income Taxes, Integration, and Income Trusts, 54 CAN.
TAX J. 633, 648-53 (2006) (surveying the mixed evidence for the open-economy model and
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nance, an increase in their margins of safety.
In fact, the revenue imperative associated with the provision of refund-
able credits for tax-exempt and nonresident investors is probably the
more compelling basis for the limitation of dividend imputation credits to
taxable resident shareholders of domestic corporations. As an incidental
effect, denial of imputation credits for tax exempts and nonresidents can
mute demand for dividend distributions and reinforce a retention bias
with its maintenance of margins of safety.2 2 7 Ideally, a focus on rein-
forcement of this bias dictates adoption of an advance corporation tax
(ACT) applicable to dividend distributions to ensure that imputation
credits are available only to the extent of actual tax paid. At its most
fundamental level, an ACT attempts to limit the benefit of corporate tax
expenditures, as well as any mismeasurement of income through the use
of financial accounting conventions, to retained earnings.228 Washing out
of the value of corporate tax preferences and income mismeasurement on
distribution is usually based on the empirical premise that the delivery of
corporate tax preferences is not sufficiently enhanced through a lower
cost of capital associated with the flow through to shareholders. With
correction of excessive risk taking through excessive leverage as the pol-
icy goal, the associated retention bias is the more important effect. But
national tax policymakers must still determine that the administrative and
compliance costs associated with an ACT are less than the benefits attrib-
utable to such a bias.229
suggesting that the capital market in Canada may be segmented such that the open-econ-
omy characterization applies to some investors and corporations while a closed-economy
characterization applies to others).
227. By segmenting shareholders, dividend streaming delivers the benefit of tax shield-
ing of corporate income to those shareholders who value it most. Dividend streaming is a
significant problem for dividend imputation systems and has required specific anti-avoid-
ance legislation. See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, How Corporate Integration Could Kill the Mar-
ket for Corporate Tax Shelters, 61 TAX L. REv. 145, 145-48, 153-55, 163-67 (2008)
(observing that the provision of full integration through, for example, refundable imputa-
tion credits causes different valuations of the benefit of tax shielding among shareholders
subject to different tax rates, different investment time horizons, or both).
228. Adoption of an ACT to wash out corporate level preferences on distribution of
tax-preferred income may be especially important for the financial services sector in the
event that general or dynamic loan loss provisioning is used for regulatory purposes and is
accepted, rather than more restrictive specific provisioning, as an additional means of pro-
moting maintenance of margins of safety. See, e.g., IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note
5, at 17 (noting that dynamic or general provisioning includes a systematic and mandatory
counter-cyclical element but raises tax issues); IMF, Lessons, supra note 98, at 13-14 (re-
viewing various forms of prudential reserve provisioning).
229. For a review of some of the relevant issues, see Edgar, supra note 204, at 1240-44.
An especially contentious policy issue is the treatment of foreign-source income earned by
domestic corporations. Application of a comprehensive ACT treats foreign-source income
much like a tax expenditure and washes out any recognition of source-country tax on dis-
tribution as a dividend. See generally C. John Taylor, Alternative Treatments for Foreign
Source Income in Australia's Dividend Imputation System, 20 AusTL. TAX F. 189 (2005)
(discussing the effects of a range of alternative treatments of foreign-source income under
a dividend imputation system that attempts to ensure that credit is limited to tax-paid cor-
porate income). The administrative and compliance costs of an ACT regime are limited in
Canada to preferred shares that can be considered tax-driven debt substitutes. See Income
Tax Act R.S.C., c. 1, pts. IV.1, VI.1 (5th Supp.) (1985) (Can.).
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Denial of imputation credits for tax-exempt and nonresident investors
means, of course, that a tax bias in favor of corporate debt continues to
hold for such investors. In the absence of a generalized rule of nonde-
ductibility for corporate interest expense, this debt tax bias may be ad-
dressed by comprehensive thin capitalization or earnings stripping rules.
This particular legislative response is noted only briefly in the IMF paper
and is criticized as ad hoc in nature. 230 The characterization may be at-
tributable to the fact that the rationale for, and design details of, existing
regimes vary considerably. Even so, there are two emerging trends in
such legislation which potentially give it some conceptual coherence. 231
One trend is a move away from a focus on the use of related-party debt as
disguised equity in favor of an application to all debt-both related-party
and arm's-length debt-in an effort to limit the deductibility of corporate
interest expense within a specified leverage ratio.232 Another trend is a
move away from a focus on inbound direct investment to either:
* symmetrical application in the context of outbound and inbound di-
rect investment; or
* application equally in a purely domestic context and a cross-border
context (both inbound and outbound). 233
In the cross-border context, application of thin capitalization legislation
to all debt of a corporation can be rationalized as an attempt to limit the
tax-driven sourcing of the interest expense of multinational corporate
groups in the context of both inbound and outbound direct investment.
In the purely domestic context, similar application of thin capitalization
legislation can be rationalized as an attempt to moderate the tax bias in
favor of debt for a range of investors, including tax exempts and private-
equity funds.234
230. IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 13.
231. See Tim Edgar, Jonathan Farrar & Amin Mawani, Foreign Direct Investment, Thin
Capitalization, and the Interest Expense Deduction: A Policy Analysis, 56 CAN. TAX J. 803,
810-11 (2008).
232. Id. at 811.
233. Id. at 810-11.
234. The extension in some EU countries of interest deductibility restrictions to arm's-
length debt has been motivated by the European Court of Justice's characterization of thin
capitalization regimes that are limited to related-party debt in the context of inbound di-
rect investment as a violation of the right to freedom of establishment under the EC
Treaty. See Christoph Kaserer, Restricting Interest Deductions in Corporate Tax Systems:
Its Impact on Investment Decisions and Capital Markets 5 (European Private Equity &
Venture Capital Ass'n, Special Paper, 2008), available at http://ssrn.abstract=1130718 (sug-
gesting that the adoption of thin capitalization and earnings-stripping legislation applicable
to arm's-length, as well as related-party debt, has been motivated by concern over income
shifting by multinationals and the high leverage ratios resulting from corporate acquisitions
by private-equity funds); see also OECD, supra note 5, at 19 (suggesting that country "best
practice" standards should be developed for the application of thin capitalization rules to
leveraged buyout cases); Council Resolution of 8 June 2010 on coordination of the Con-
trolled Foreign Corporation (CFC) and thin capitalisation rules within the European Union,
at 2, COM (2010) 156 final (June 16, 2010) (recommending that, when applying thin capi-
talization rules within the EU that are not applicable in domestic situations, consideration
should be given to (1) the level of debt to equity, (2) the amount of net interest beyond a
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Although the associated rationale differs depending on the context, the
different rationales do not mean that thin capitalization legislation is ad
hoc in nature. Indeed, a comprehensive application of thin capitalization
legislation to limit the deduction of corporate-interest expense within a
specified leverage ratio can comprehensively constrain the scope of a tax
bias in favor of debt finance and support maintenance of margins of
safety at the firm level. A difficult targeting issue is the specification of
an acceptable leverage ratio. Admittedly, there will be an element of ar-
bitrariness in the choice of a specified ratio at the firm level, with particu-
lar industry mean or median ratios serving as rough benchmarks.235
Moreover, with the possible exception of the financial sector-where reg-
ulatory capital ratios can be used for tax purposes-any correlation be-
tween a targeted macro limitation on credit creation as indicative of
declining margins of safety and the results produced by aggregate lever-
age ratios at the firm level, as constrained by comprehensive thin capitali-
zation legislation, will also be somewhat random.236 In effect,
specification of a permissible leverage ratio at the firm level can produce
defensible results at a macro level, albeit entirely incidentally.237 Because
it is less sensitive to changes in asset value and earnings, thin capitaliza-
tion legislation that is intended, at least in part, to moderate financial
instability should probably be based on tax-book asset value. This ap-
proach allows the constraint on leverage levels for income tax purposes to
operate somewhat independently of the market forces that can otherwise
lead to increasing levels of leverage as a function of rising asset values
and earnings.238
The incomplete consistency of taxation that is characteristic of dividend
imputation systems also leaves in place the significance of the familiar
specific threshold, and (3) a comparison between the equity percentage of a company to
that of its worldwide group).
235. Regulatory ratios provide a convenient benchmark for the financial services sec-
tor. See, e.g., Income Tax Act R.S.C., c. 1, pt. 1, § 20.2(3) (5th Supp.) (1985) (Can.) (pro-
viding a 95 percent debt-to-risk-weighted-assets ratio for authorized foreign bank
branches). The Australian thin capitalization legislation specifies the level of permissible
debt for authorized deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) in terms of a required capital base
equal to 4% of risk-weighted assets. See Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) Division
820.405 (Austl.).
236. See Geanakoplos, supra note 42, at 5-6 (emphasizing the lack of data on leverage
levels, which are defined as the "ratio of collateral values to the down payment that must
be made to buy them").
237. See IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 11-12 (observing that the tax bias
in favor of corporate debt may undercut the effectiveness of regulatory requirements for
the financial services sector, with the impact of externalities at a macro level likely to be
especially large for this sector because of its systemic importance).
238. See Geanakoplos, supra note 42, at 5-6. Permitted tax-leverage ratios could follow
regulatory ratios generally for specified asset classes and could be set at lower levels during
periods of prosperity in an effort to moderate the leverage cycle. Such an approach would
be particularly important for traders or dealers who mark financial assets and liabilities to
market for income tax purposes. See infra note 295 and accompanying text. "Dynamic
provisioning" for portfolio losses varies regulatory capital requirements through the busi-
ness cycle by building up a margin of safety for losses yet to be incurred during an eco-
nomic upswing and allowing some losses to be met in a downswing from this margin of
safety. See, e.g., TURNER REVIEW, supra note 79, at 61.
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tax-law boundary between debt and equity. 239 By combining features
commonly associated with one or the other form of instrument, debt-eq-
uity hybrids can be used in an attempt to:
* change the tax-law character of dividend payments to interest (tax-
deductible equity); or
* change the tax-law character of interest payments to dividends
(debt-like shares).
The conventional tax-policy focus is the revenue loss and efficiency ef-
fects associated with tax-driven substitution along this tax-law bound-
ary.2 4 0 However, as the IMF paper notes, the substitution of tax-
deductible equity for debt may "ease the inefficiencies created by differ-
ential tax treatment of the two [at the cost of loss of revenue] . . . and
increased complexity and opacity of financial arrangements." 2 4 1 In other
words, tax-deductible instruments with equity features are imperfect sub-
stitutes that can enhance margins of safety, but at the cost of lost revenue
and otherwise desirable nontax features.
The extent to which hybrid instruments are developed as tax-driven
substitutes remains unclear empirically,242 with various nontax factors ap-
pearing to constrain complete substitutability. 243 Furthermore, tax-law
uncertainty acts as an additional friction that constrains tax-driven inno-
vation of publicly traded securities because of the pricing effect for tax
clienteles.244 In this environment, tax policymakers and tax administra-
tors have tended to use a combination of specific anti-avoidance rules,
classification rules targeted to particular hybrids, and a generalized-fac-
tors approach to constrain taxpayer electivity along the debt-equity
239. See Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1065-72 (2000).
240. The different income tax treatment of interest and dividends and the associated
boundary between debt and equity have preoccupied tax policymakers, tax administrators,
and tax practitioners while attracting considerable attention in the academic literature.
There are two quite distinct types of this literature. One type focuses on fundamental
reform intended to realize consistency of treatment of debt and equity. Another type fo-
cuses on execution of the tax-law boundary. For an interesting combination of these two
types of literature, see generally Pratt, supra note 239.
241. IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 11.
242. A notable exception is Ellen Engel, Merle Erickson & Edward Maydew, Debt-
Equity Hybrid Securities, 37 J. Accr. REs. 249, 249-50 (1999) (examining a particular form
of tax-deductible preferred shares, referred to as trust preferred stock (TRUPs), to iden-
tify: "(i) the extent to which firms will incur costs to manage the balance-sheet classifica-
tion of a security; (ii) the magnitude of net tax benefits . . . associated with leverage-
increasing capital structure decisions; and (iii) the extent to which investor-level taxation
imposes implicit taxes on securities"); see also Gordon Mackenzie, Taxation as a Driver for
Designing Hybrid Securities, 1 J. APPLIED REs. Accr. & FIN. 31, 32 (2006) (suggesting that
the design of hybrid securities in Australia was driven more by accounting and regulatory
changes than the adoption of comprehensive debt-equity classification rules for income tax
purposes).
243. See Shaviro, supra note 5, at 5 ("If taxpayers can simply marry the preferred eco-
nomic characteristics of financial arrangements to whichever tax label (debt or equity) they
prefer-a situation that increasingly prevails although still not entirely-then the problem
is simply one of making aggressive tax planning too easy. . . .").
244. See Mark P. Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The Influence of Tax Law on Securities
Innovation in the United States: 1981-1997, 52 TAx L. REV. 119, 119-20 (1997).
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boundary.245 Because comprehensive thin capitalization rules are pre-
mised on a prior characterization of particular instruments as debt or eq-
uity, they can address the use of such instruments only indirectly.
Nonetheless, by constraining the use of all forms of tax-deductible debt
(whether hybrid in nature or not), a comprehensive thin capitalization
regime is a direct and potentially effective policy instrument implicated
by a focus on promotion of maintenance of margins of safety. Introduc-
tion of the same focus as a policy-relevant factor in the execution of the
debt-equity classification exercise would not appear to add anything of
definitive policy value, given the lack of empirical knowledge of the ex-
tent of the use of tax-deductible hybrids with equity features that might
enhance maintenance of margins of safety. 246
C. TAXATION OF SHARE GAINS
At least as an initial proposition, there is nothing special about capital
gains, as a subset of disposition gains, which would suggest that the con-
cept be used as a gateway to the provision of a lower tax rate. Apprecia-
tion in the value of an asset over its cost is a gain, and any decline is a
loss. These critical values are determined by discounting expected cash
flows at an appropriate risk-adjusted rate. The passage of time reveals
changes in expectations that affect those cash flows and, in turn, the value
of the asset. The fact that cash flows are realized on disposition, produc-
ing a gain or a loss, is arguably an arbitrary basis for recognition at a
reduced rate. Moreover, the fact that an asset is acquired for the purpose
of trading does nothing to alter the nature of the associated cash flows in
a manner that should alter the tax treatment. There is, however, exten-
sive literature challenging these simplistic propositions and articulating
various reasons for preferential treatment of capital gains.247 The narrow
point made briefly here in Part IV.C is that, even where standard tax
rates are applied to gain or loss on financial instruments generally, an
exception to noncapital treatment might defensibly be made for share
gains in an attempt to approximate the shareholder tax rate on dividends.
Rather than the standard anti-avoidance rationale, this rate equivalence
can be justified as an attempt to further reinforce a retention bias and to
promote the maintenance of margins of safety.
A capital gains preference is often justified as a stimulus to risk tak-
ing.2 4 8 As such, the preference should probably be limited to unexpected
245. Australia is notable in its adoption of legislation that purports to comprehensively
classify all financial instruments as debt or equity based on the presence of noncontingent
payments. See Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) Division 974.10 (Austl.).
246. The same empirical uncertainty holds with the use of such hybrids to discipline
managerial "cash burning." See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
247. For a comprehensive review of these arguments, see generally RICK KREVER &
NEIL BROOKS, A CAPITAL GAINS TAX FOR NEW ZEALAND 41-86 (1990); LEONARD E.
BURMAN, THE LABYRINTH OF CAPITAL GAINS TAX POLICY: A GUIDE FOR THE PER-
PLEXED 42-83 (1999).
248. William D. Popkin, The Deep Structure of Capital Gains, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
153, 154 (1983).
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gains that are attributable to the bet element in financial instruments. 249
Yet, to address revenue loss and inefficiencies associated with tax-avoid-
ance transactions, gain or loss attributable to the bet element in deriva-
tive financial instruments, as well as debt,2 5 0 can be subjected to
noncapital treatment, leaving any capital gains preference to apply to
shares that combine an expected time-value return with a substantial bet
element. 25 1 Here again, an income tax system can defensibly distinguish
between shares of closely-held and widely-held corporations in its effect
on risk taking. As already emphasized above in Part IV.B, a possible
equity capital market bias in the context of closely-held corporations can
be addressed by provision of a lower rate of corporate tax that encour-
ages retention of earnings. A capital gains preference that is limited to
shares of such corporations can be seen to reinforce this incentive effect.
With shares of widely held corporations, there is no such bias and full
taxation of realized gains could suppress some of the churning that is
characteristic of speculative trading, without significantly diminishing the
price revelation and liquidity functions provided by public trading.252
But a tax bias in favor of retention can also be seen as desirable if sup-
pression of excessive leverage and promotion of maintenance of margins
of safety is the paramount policy goal. In fact, when the policy goal is
reframed in this manner, a capital gains tax preference-just like a corpo-
rate/shareholder tax-rate gap-can be supported equally for shares of
closely held and widely held corporations. In terms of rate choice, a capi-
tal gains tax rate for shares that approximates the dividend tax rate can
preserve the positive features of a retention bias while avoiding the crea-
tion of tax-avoidance opportunities in the form of dividend-stripping
transactions. 2 5 3
Even with a preferential tax rate for share gains, an element of double
taxation remains under dividend imputation systems because of a general
failure to integrate the corporate and shareholder-level taxes when re-
249. See id. at 155, 174-76 (arguing that the distinction between expected and unex-
pected gains and losses distinguishes time-value returns from returns to risk taking and the
associated bet element that is the target of a capital gains preference provided as a stimulus
to risk taking).
250. See, e.g., Eddins, supra note 5, at 2 (arguing that different tax rates of capital mar-
ket participants produce incentives that contribute strongly to financial instability).
251. See TIM EDGAR, THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS.
THEORY AND PRACTICE 101-06 (2000).
252. See, e.g., KREVER & BROOKS, supra note 247, at 82-84 (arguing that any adverse
effects on risk taking may be offset by the substantial presence of tax-exempt investors,
such as pension funds and venture capital corporations, that benefit from significant tax
preferences and provide an adequate supply of risk capital at prices that do not exceed the
risk-adjusted opportunity cost of capital); see also Alan J. Auerbach, Capital Gains Taxa-
tion and Tax Reform, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 391, 395 (1989); Daniel Halperin, A Capital Gains
Preference Is Not Even a Second-Best Solution, 48 TAX L. REV. 381, 385-87 (1993) (em-
phasizing that a lower capital gains tax rate may only alter the pattern of ownership or
allocation of financial assets and not the overall level of investment, with no serious ineffi-
ciencies for the economy as a whole).
253. See, e.g., Mintz & Richardson, supra note 207, at 398 (emphasizing the need to
maintain consistency of dividend and capital gain tax rates on shares).
1015
SMU LAW REVIEW
tained earnings are reflected in the value of shares realized on a disposi-
tion in the secondary market. In short, limitation of imputation regimes
to dividend distributions means that an element of double taxation arises
similar to that under classical corporate income tax systems. However,
any efficiency losses associated with this element of double taxation are
uncertain. By providing a credit for corporate income tax paid, imputa-
tion systems maintain the integrated treatment of dividend distributions,
which reduces the double taxation of the distributed income. Where the
distributed income has previously been taxed as a gain realized on a dis-
position of the relevant shares, a corresponding loss attributable to the
dividend distribution will arise. To the extent that recognition of the loss
is permitted,254 the amount can be considered to effectively offset the
prior gain, thereby eliminating any double taxation. Although this offset
is far from complete, it at least reduces the incidence of double taxation.
Perhaps more importantly, any double taxation that ultimately arises be-
cause of the imposition of unintegrated corporate and shareholder-level
income taxes on a secondary-market transfer may be an overstated cause
of efficiency losses, with any such losses compensated for by a tax bias in
favor of retention as a means to promote maintenance of margins of
safety.
V. LOSS LIMITATIONS AND RISK TAKING
As a stimulus to risk taking, the provision of a capital gains preference
presumes the presence of a market failure that results in an inadequate
pool of risk capital. There is no clear evidence, however, that the level of
risk capital is deficient or that any discrimination in the tax system against
such investment by taxable investors causes a shortfall.255 It may instead
be the case that, in combination with an unrestricted interest expense de-
duction, a capital gains tax preference results in excessive risk taking in
capital markets. In fact, Minsky's financial instability hypothesis, along
with the mismeasurement of risk in capital markets, suggests that a lower
capital gains tax rate may exacerbate such behavior even in the presence
of:
* a reduced recognition rate for capital losses reflecting the reduced
inclusion rate for capital gains; and
* a restriction on the deductibility of capital losses to the amount of
realized capital gains as a response to the problem of selective
realization.
Each of these features effectively increases the after-tax value of capi-
tal losses such that deviation from the expected return associated with an
254. Various rationales for limitations on the recognition of losses generally on financial
instruments are discussed infra in Part V.
255. See Agnar Sandmo, The Effects of Taxation on Savings and Risk Taking, in 1
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIc EcoNoMics 265, 293-95, 307 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feld-
stein eds., 1985) (concluding that there is no conclusive basis to tax risky assets inconsis-
tently with riskless assets).
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asset is increased and, hence, the associated risk. As posited in the taxa-
tion and risk taking literature, the attractiveness of risky investments is
reduced, which is presumed to result in a suboptimal level of risk tak-
ing.2 5 6 But various features of markets for financial assets emphasized by
Minsky's financial instability hypothesis suggest that the increased after-
tax return from a lower capital gains tax rate may exert a much stronger
pull in the direction of increased risk taking than the push of increased
after-tax losses in the other direction.257
In the wake of the recent credit crisis, the IMF paper notes only the
ambiguous effect that certain tax features, such as a capital gains prefer-
ence, can have on asset prices.258 It also briefly reviews the possible ef-
fects of the treatment of losses on risk taking, suggesting that limitations
on loss deductibility, as well as the application of progressive personal tax
rates, can act to suppress it.2 5 9 Consistent with the other limited tax-pol-
icy literature, 260 the IMF paper observes that this effect may be desirable
where an unspecified set of nontax factors leads to excessive risk tak-
ing.2 6 1 This Part attempts to fill in much of the reasoning supporting this
position. It is at least plausible that capital loss quarantining and a re-
duced recognition rate for capital losses are insufficient to suppress exces-
sive risk taking. Corrective tax policy may require full taxation rates
applicable to gains on financial instruments and a combination of:
* tighter loss limitations applicable to such instruments; and
* comprehensive interest expense deductibility restrictions under the
personal income tax as a form of loss limitation.262
A. DOMAR-MUSGRAVE AND THE TAXATION AND RISK
TAKING LITERATURE
Any discussion of the effect of taxation on risk taking begins with the
model articulated over sixty years ago by Evsey Domar and Richard
256. Id. at 293.
257. See, e.g., Slemrod, supra note 5, at 390 (observing that preferential treatment of
capital gains dominates when excessively optimistic investors do not account for restricted
recognition of capital losses); see also BURMAN, supra note 247, at 120 (noting that it is
unclear whether a rate preference is required, in addition to the deferral benefit from taxa-
tion of capital gains on a realization basis, to offset the increase in the after-tax value of
losses because of incomplete offset).
258. IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 31-33 (concluding that "[s]tructural tax
policy is best guided by the core objective of neutrality across assets and over time").
259. Id. at 28-29.
260. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
261. IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 28.
262. As a means to reinforce a retention bias and maintenance of margins of safety,
share gains could be excluded from noncapital treatment and subject to a preferential tax
rate approximating the rate on dividends. See supra notes 247-54 and accompanying text.
This rationale would not extend to short sales. But see Michael R. Powers, David M.
Schizer & Martin Shubik, Market Bubbles and Wasteful Avoidance: Tax and Regulatory
Constraints on Short Sales, 57 TAX L. REv. 233, 262-63 (2004) (noting that a preferential
tax rate for long positions in shares, even where it is justified as a means to alleviate the
double taxation of corporate equity income, might be extended to short sales to constrain
upward price pressure).
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Musgrave.263 Under the simple Domar-Musgrave model, portfolio
choice is limited to two assets:
* an asset without default risk yielding no real return; and
* a risky asset in the sense that its payoff depends on a specified
contingency. 264
To illustrate the fundamental insight of the model, assume that a risky
asset is acquired at a cost of $100 and has a 50% chance of paying $120 or
a 50% chance of paying $80. The expected return is zero ([0.5 x $20] -
[0.5 x ($20)]), which is consistent with the expected return on an alterna-
tive riskless asset. Investors determine the composition of their portfolios
based on their taste for risk. Symmetrical treatment of losses and gains
ensures that the after-tax gain/loss ratio is the same as the pre-tax ra-
tio.2 6 5 For example, at a 40% tax rate, the positive payoff would be $12,
and the negative payoff would be ($12) (assuming refundability of losses
for income tax purposes at the 40% rate). In effect, the government
shares at the same tax rate in both gains and losses on the risky asset. By
lowering the variance of possible payoffs, symmetrical taxation of gains
and losses reduces risk associated with the risky asset and may induce a
portfolio shift out of the riskless asset. However, an income effect may
dominate the substitution effect,266 with the government effectively serv-
ing a risk-bearing function through the tax system. In this respect, recent
consumption tax literature 267 has emphasized the income effect and, in
particular, the ability of taxpayers to eliminate the taxation of the return
to risk-bearing by scaling up their risky asset positions to maintain the
263. Evsey Domar & Richard Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and Risk-Tak-
ing, 58 Q.J. ECON. 388 (1944). For an expansion of the Domar-Musgrave model, see gen-
erally Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Effects of Income, Wealth, and Capital Gains Taxation on
Risk-Taking, 83 Q.J. ECON. 263 (1969); James Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior To-
wards Risk, 25 REV. ECON. STUD. 65 (1958).
264. Domar & Musgrave, supra note 263, at 400.
265. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and
a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does It Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377, 392 (1992).
266. See Terrence R. Chorvat & Gavin Elkins, The Effect of the Taxation of Risky In-
come on Investment Behavior 1 (Sept. 29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/toronto-workshopschorvat.pdf (laboratory experiment
with university students as subjects indicates no scaling up in the presence of symmetrical
taxation of gain and loss and likely scaling down).
267. If taxpayers can freely adjust their investment portfolios to maintain the same pre-
tax return on risky assets, only the normal or riskless rate of return may be exempted
under a consumption tax and taxed under an income tax. The same proposition may ex-
tend to the risk premium for undiversifiable risk. See Joseph Bankman & Barbara H.
Fried, Winners and Losers in the Shift to a Consumption Tax, 86 GEo. L.J. 539, 541-42
(1998); Bankman & Griffith, supra note 265, at 392; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capi-
tal Income Taxed Under an Income Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L.
REV. 1, 9-12 (1996); David A. Weisbach, The (Non) Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX L. REV. 1,
15-19 (2004). The model on which this literature is based is articulated in Louis Kaplow,
Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 789, 790-91
(1994); see also Jeremy I. Bulow & Lawrence H. Summers, The Taxation of Risky Assets, 92
J. POL. EcoN. 20, 22-25 (1984); Roger H. Gordon, Taxation of Corporate Capital Income:
Tax Revenues Versus Tax Distortions, 100 Q.J. ECON. 1, 16-17 (1985).
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variance associated with their pre-tax positions.268
By introducing asymmetric taxation of gain and loss on risky assets,
limitations on loss deductibility alter the after-tax gain/loss ratio as com-
pared to the pre-tax ratio.269 If, for example, losses are not recognized
while gains are taxed at 40%, the after-tax amount of the negative payoff
on the risky asset in the above example is the same as its pre-tax amount
of $20; yet the after-tax amount of the positive payoff is $12. With the
gain/loss ratio altered in this particular direction, investors may substitute
the riskless asset for the risky asset. Common features of tax systems,
such as loss limitations and progressive personal tax rates, introduce
asymmetric treatment of gains and losses, which negates the ability to
scale the magnitude of the bet element associated with risky assets.
Where the income effect dominates, governments are able to tax returns
to risk.270 Where the substitution effect dominates, risk taking is ad-
versely affected, with possible efficiency losses attributable to the shift
away from risky assets.
In fact, loss limitations and progressive personal income tax rates have
much the same effect as transaction costs and other nontax factors that
constrain scaling as well as the substitution effect.271 Deborah Schenk
argues, for example, that the imputation of interest at the riskless rate on
all capital assets (including shares) is normatively desirable as a tax base,
268. See Thomas J. Brennan, Certainty and Uncertainty in the Taxation of Risky Returns
17 (Apr. 23, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (observing that symmet-
ric taxation of the return to risky assets provides a tax payoff profile equivalent to that of a
forward contract written on the underlying asset in an amount equal to the tax that can be
eliminated by entering into an equal and opposite forward contract).
269. Asymmetric taxation of gains and losses can also be a function of the application
of progressive personal income tax rates. See Shaviro, supra note 5, at 13 (suggesting that a
progressive tax rate structure is the principal source of asymmetric taxation for individual
entrepreneurs, while loss limitations are the principal source for large publicly-traded cor-
porations). The extent that loss limitations are binding, and thereby result in asymmetric
taxation of gains and losses, may differ under the personal income tax and the corporate
income tax. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Leonard E. Burman & Jonathan M. Siegel, Capital
Gains Taxation and Tax Avoidance: New Evidence from Panel Data, in DOES ATLAS
SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 355, 377-78 (Joel Slemrod
ed., 2000) (finding that most individuals in the United States were able to deduct capital
losses within one or two years of realization given the ability to deduct up to $3,000 of such
losses annually against ordinary income); Alan J. Auerbach, Why Have Corporate Tax Rev-
enues Declined? Another Look, 53 CESIFo ECON. STUD. 153, 161 (2007) (finding that non-
deductible current losses net of net operating losses in the corporate sector increased from
11% of income in 1996-1997 to 44% in 2001-03); Rosanne Altshuler & Alan J. Auerbach,
The Significance of Tax Law Asymmetries: An Empirical Investigation, 105 Q.J. ECON. 61,
71 (1990) (finding for the period 1976-1982 that one-half of firms in the nonfinancial sec-
tor, weighted by book assets, were required to carry forward tax benefits); Michael Cooper
& Matthew Knittel, Partial Loss Refundability: How Are Corporate Tax Losses Used?, 59
NAT'L TAX J. 651 (2006) (finding for a dataset of firms for the period 1993-2003 that (i) 50-
60% of tax losses are used over a ten-year carryover period; and (ii) 25-30% of tax losses
expire unused).
270. See generally Reuven Avi-Yonah, Risk, Rents, and Regressivity: Why the United
States Needs Both an Income Tax and a VAT, 105 TAX NOTES 1651 (2004).
271. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 199, at 609-17; David Elkins & Christopher H.
Hanna, Taxation of Supernormal Returns, 62 TAX LAw. 93 (2008) (suggesting that scaling is
unavailable with assets yielding supernormal returns to human capital and should be taxed
under a consumption tax).
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since the return to risk is taxed only accidentally under an income tax
when nontax factors constrain the ability to alter portfolios in response to
the tax.27 2 Loss limitations, however, have independent normative signif-
icance under an income tax and have generally been seen by tax policy-
makers to trump possible efficiency losses associated with any behavioral
response to asymmetric tax rates for gains and losses. Moreover, the tax-
ation and risk taking literature assumes that risk is accurately priced, in
which case the application of asymmetric rates can induce a behavioral
response with efficiency losses.273 As emphasized in Part II.B, the dy-
namics of financial markets, along with incomplete risk-modeling tech-
niques, have destabilizing consequences. In this environment, loss
limitations can also be justified as a constraint on excessive risk taking.274
But even ignoring the quantitative targeting problem attributable to an
inability to calibrate the amount of any corrective tax, the use of loss
limitations to moderate risk taking presents a difficult qualitative target-
ing issue. In particular, it is necessary to distinguish between different
types of losses for income tax purposes, since not all losses are attributa-
ble to risk taking.2 7 5 A defensible distinction may also be drawn between
losses that are attributable to risk taking in the market for consumer
goods and services and the same type of losses incurred in financial mar-
kets. As a constraint on excessive risk taking, the case for tight loss limi-
tations is strongest in the latter setting, subject to an important exception
for a hedge-accounting regime.
The standard rationale for loss limitations is the revenue cost that
refundability would entail The more nuanced version of this rationale
depends on the cause of the loss. For this purpose, losses may be charac-
terized as within one of the following general types:
* economic losses attributable to risk taking;
* tax losses attributable to the provision of tax expenditures or pref-
erences for particular types of investment or activities;
* income mismeasurement losses attributable to income inclusion or
expense deduction features that are adopted for compliance cost or
administrative reasons; and
272. Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV.
423, 444-48 (2000); see also Lawrence Zelenak, The Sometimes-Taxation of the Returns to
Risk-Bearing Under a Progressive Income Tax, 59 SMU L. REV. 879, 898-99 (2006) (em-
phasizing the erratic taxation of risk under progressive tax rates). But see Brennan, supra
note 268, at 17 (demonstrating that asymmetric treatment of risky returns produces tax
burdens that are both systematic and quantifiable).
273. See COOPER, supra note 31, at 151-52 (observing that the risk management indus-
try may produce probability distributions that are too narrow).
274. IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 28-29.
275. See Thomas Abhayaratna & Shane Johnson, Revisiting Tax Losses, 24 AusTL. TAX
F. 59, 64-66 (2009). See generally Michael J. McIntyre, Identifying Tax Losses Entitled to
Full Loss Offsets in a Business Profits Tax Under the Domar-Musgrave Risk Model, 24
Ausm. TAX F. 77 (2009); Satya Poddar & Morley English, Treatment of Tax Losses: Les-
sons from the Canadian Experience, in TAXATION TOWARDs 2000, at 479 (John G. Head &
Richard Krever eds., 1997).
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* tax-avoidance losses and/or fraudulent activity losses attributable to
tax-avoidance transactions intended to create or transfer the loss
and/or fraudulent reporting of revenue or expense. 276
Loss limitations within the third and fourth categories can be used to
protect revenue where, respectively, income measurement rules cannot
be improved or anti-avoidance provisions and enforcement measures
targeting tax avoidance and/or tax evasion are incomplete.277 Limitations
on losses within the first and second categories may be chosen as an alter-
native to refundability because of the associated revenue cost.2 7 8 With
tax losses attributable to the provision of tax expenditures, the value of
the particular tax expenditure is reduced, but presumably on the basis of
an assessment that the amount of any forgone efficiency gains attributa-
ble to the behavioral response otherwise intended to be induced by the
tax-expenditure program are less than the revenue saved by limiting the
cost of the program. With economic losses attributable to risk taking, any
associated efficiency losses are presumably seen to be less than the reve-
nue saved by a rejection of refundability.
McIntyre argues that the adoption of broad loss limitations applicable
equally across losses within all four of these general categories is required
in the absence of an ability to identify and prohibit the deduction of
losses that are attributable to income mismeasurement or tax avoidance/
fraudulent activity. 2 7 9 This identification problem leaves tax policymak-
ers with the choice of selective refundability, either full or partial, for
economic and tax losses arising in specified circumstances or in connec-
tion with specified activities. For example, tax-expenditure programs,
such as preferential treatment for expenditures on basic research, are
often delivered in the form of refundable tax credits.280 Alternatively,
losses generated with accelerated recognition of capital expenses may be
permitted to be flowed through to investors for recognition. These ex-
ceptions to less than full refundability of expenses enhance the value of
the relevant program where such enhancement is considered desirable. It
is much more difficult, however, to extend full loss refundability beyond
these kinds of specified expenditure programs without also providing rec-
ognition of losses attributable to income mismeasurement and tax-avoid-
ance/fraudulent activity.
276. Abhayaratna & Johnson, supra note 275, at 64-66; Poddar & English, supra note
275, at 492-96.
277. Abhayaratna & Johnson, supra note 275, at 65.
278. Id.
279. McIntyre, supra note 275, at 86-88; see also 2 AusTL. Gov'T REVIEW PANEL, Aus-
TRALIA'S FUTURE TAX SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE TREASURER 175 (Dec. 2009), available at
http://www.taxreview.treaury.gov.au [hereinafter TAX REVIEW PANEL] (noting that the
treatment of business losses should reduce biases against risk taking, but this goal must be
balanced against problems arising from the mismeasurement of losses attributable to diffi-
culties in measuring economic income, artificial loss creation schemes or other forms of tax
avoidance).
280. See, e.g., Francisco Moris, The U.S. Research, and Experimentation Tax Credits
in the 1990s, SCIENCE RESOURCES STATISTICS INFO BRIEF (2005), http://www.nsf.gov/
statistics/inbrief/nsf0516.pdf.
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This identification exercise emphasized by McIntyre is arguably altered
where limitations on the recognition of risk-based losses are justified as a
means to dampen excessive risk taking. Under this very different ratio-
nale, limitations on such losses serve as a form of corrective taxation that
is intended to induce a portfolio shift away from risky assets. Indeed, the
behavioral response assumed to be suboptimal in the taxation and risk
taking literature becomes a desirable effect of limitations on economic
losses, presumably on the basis that risk is otherwise mismeasured or, as
suggested by Minsky's financial instability hypothesis, investors reduce
margins of safety as they increasingly take on leverage in an environment
of rising asset prices and profits.28' But, as noted already, operationaliz-
ing this particular rationale for the application of limitations on the recog-
nition of risk-based losses may require a distinction to be drawn between
the incurrence of these losses in the market for consumer goods and ser-
vices and those losses incurred in capital markets. The former may pro-
vide the best case for the empirical assumption in the taxation and risk
taking literature that asymmetric treatment of gains and losses attributa-
ble to the imposition of loss limitations imposes efficiency losses attribu-
table to the substitution effect. In effect, risk associated with investments
in the real economy is often undiversifiable, and the case is strongest for
the government to act as a risk bearer through the provision of either loss
refundability or carryover with an interest gross-up to preserve the full
value of any loss. 2 8 2 Tax policymakers must still exercise judgment that
any efficiency gains warrant the associated revenue loss and the potential
for inappropriate recognition of losses attributable to income mis-
measurement, tax-avoidance/fraudulent activity or any combination
thereof. In this respect, forms of limited loss refundability tend to be
281. See MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 13, at 208-09.
282. See. e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Notes on Taxation and Risk Taking, 24 AusTL. TAX F.
31, 34 (2009) (observing that government could potentially improve diversification by pro-
viding the equivalent of insurance through the tax system for assets that are traded in
limited markets); Michael P. Devereux & Clemens Fuest, Is the Corporation Tax an Effec-
tive Automatic Stabilizer?, 62 NAT'L TAX J. 429, 436 (2009) (arguing that more generous
treatment of losses would help to smooth the effect of investment shocks to corporate
income and thereby enhance the corporate income tax as an automatic stabilizer); Shaviro,
supra note 5, at 15 ("Thus, one could plausibly surmise that the main risk-discouraging
effects of nonrefundability relate to risk-taking that has greater social merit, such as that by
entrepreneurs establishing start-up companies in which the players will largely bear their
own losses rather than passing them onto others in the manner of 'too-big-to-fail' financial
institutions."); see also Michael G. Cooper & Matthew J. Knittel, The Implications of
Asymmetry for U.S. Corporations, 63 NAT'L TAX J. 33 (2010) (finding for the period 1993-
2004 that partial loss refundability disproportionately affects certain industries and
younger firms); Joseph J. Thorndike, Risky Business: Using Taxes to Insure Against Loss,
125 TAX NOTES 9 (2009) (describing post-World War I proposal for delivery of business
loss insurance through the income tax system). But see Julie Berry Cullen & Roger H.
Gordon, Taxes and Entrepreneurial Risk-Taking: Theory and Evidence for the U.S., 91 J.
PuB. ECON. 1479, 1493-94, 1501 (2007) (finding that various tax law features, including loss
limitations and progressive personal rates, have collectively had large effects on the
amount of entrepreneurial activity, but observing that the option to incorporate can en-
courage risk taking by providing favorable asymmetric rates where the corporate rate is
lower than the personal rate).
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targeted to the small business sector where shares and debt of issuers are
not traded in deep and liquid markets, and investors bear undiversifiable
risk attributable to the payoff profiles and value of the underlying as-
sets.2 8 3 Moreover, transaction costs and incomplete markets mean inves-
tors cannot scale their investments in risky assets, and governments
collect tax on the returns to risk.
These same conditions do not hold with financial instruments traded in
deep and liquid markets. Unique risk can be diversified, and scaling up
the magnitude of a bet is more readily possible, particularly with deriva-
tive financial instruments. 284 Despite the lack of any definitive empirical
evidence, 28 5 limitations on the recognition of economic losses may be in-
voked as a means to moderate excessive risk-taking attributable to scal-
ing, which can have systemic risk implications when the instability-
breeding dynamics of financial markets are exacerbated by the mis-
measurement of risk or other failures of risk management. 286 In the ab-
sence of any behavioral response to loss limitations that would moderate
exposure to systemic risk, the government must assume a role of insurer
by acting as lender of last resort and propping up asset values and profits
283. See, e.g., Income Tax Act R.S.C., c. 1 pt. 1, § 3(d) (5th Supp.) (1985) (Can.) (pro-
viding noncapital loss treatment for the recognized portion of a capital loss realized on
shares and debt of "small business corporations"). Such treatment is reported as a tax
expenditure in the Canadian government's tax-expenditure accounts. But see Boadway,
supra note 204, at 125 (arguing that provisions facilitating loss offsetting should be re-
ported as memorandum items and not tax expenditures).
284. See Auerbach, supra note 282, at 34 (noting that the ability to scale a position is a
reasonable assumption for liquid assets traded in established markets but may not be as
reasonable for family businesses); see also Geanakoplos, supra note 42, at 6 (emphasizing
the scaling that occurred with the standardization of credit default swaps, which facilitated
leveraging of pessimistic views of the subprime mortgage market); Rosenzweig, supra note
17, at 264 (assuming scaling of bets with derivatives in response to taxation of the return to
risk); David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation of Derivative Securities: An Agenda for
Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1886, 1903, 1907 (2004) (observing that scaling is largely
unconstrained with derivatives that are pure bets giving rise to unexpected gain or loss).
285. See Chorvat & Elkins, supra note 266, at 6 (noting the data difficulties which make
empirical testing of the substitution effect difficult); Shaviro, supra note 5, at 3 ("Yet there
is little evidence that nonrefundability or graduated rates mattered greatly to the managers
who were taking absurd risks on behalf of publicly traded companies . . . ."); Weisbach,
supra note 267, at 45-47 (surveying the empirical literature on taxation and portfolio
choice and characterizing it as inconclusive). But see Eddins, supra note 5, at 16-19 (argu-
ing that credit default swaps permitted the stripping of credit risk and its tax-driven trans-
fer to those investors with symmetric gain and loss tax rates). The irrelevance of tax as a
factor in the scaling of bets may be inferred from the investment behavior of tax-exempt
fund managers who have aggressively pursued trading strategies designed to produce su-
pernormal returns. See, e.g., PHILIP AUGAR, CHASING ALPHA: How RECKLESS GROWTH
AND UNCHECKED AMBITION RUINED THE CITY's GOLDEN DECADE 75-95 (2009); BERN-
STEIN, EVOLVING, supra note 63, at 148-64. But see Jack Mintz & Michael Smart, Tax-
Exempt Investors and the Asset Allocation Puzzle, 83 J. PUB. ECON. 195, 196-97, 205,
210-11 (2002) (arguing that consumption tax treatment of pension funds provides the
equivalent of the front loading of loss refundability and explains the holding of risky
equities).
286. See Stulz, supra note 79, at 7-8; see also Chorvat & Elkins, supra note 266, at 20
(speculating that investment professionals may be more likely to engage in tax-driven
scaling).
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by stimulating demand in a downturn.287 The application of loss limita-
tions in publicly-traded asset markets, where diversification is otherwise
available and scaling can more readily eliminate taxation of risk, can be
defended as a form of insurance premium 2 88 that is extracted by the gov-
ernment for already serving these risk-bearing roles as lender of last re-
sort and provider of aggregate demand in an economic downturn. In
short, it is not clear that the government needs to serve an additional risk-
bearing role through the provision of loss refundability in this market.2 8 9
Serving such a risk-bearing function may even exacerbate market failures
that are the source of excessive risk taking. Although the same result
may be attributable to the government's other risk-bearing functions,
those functions must be filled by the government because of the absence
of any comparable market institution.290 This is not the case with invest-
ment in risky assets where deep and liquid markets provide a broad range
of self-insurance opportunities through portfolio diversification.
As a form of loss limitation, a prohibition on the recognition of losses
on derivative financial instruments, as well as traded debt and shares,
would be the strongest policy instrument intended to correct market fail-
ure in the form of excessive risk taking or, alternatively, to limit the ex-
tent of publicly-provided insurance in capital markets. Complete
nonrecognition of such losses could inappropriately constrain, however,
the price revelation and liquidity functions of these markets, with offset-
ting efficiency losses. 2 91 A weaker response would be a limitation of the
deduction of unexpected losses attributable to the bet element in the
same set of instruments to the amount of any unexpected gains that are
similarly attributable to the bet element in such instruments. This form of
limitation is comparable to that for capital losses under a realization-
based capital gains tax system with less than full recognition rates and is
required to the extent that gains and losses are treated on noncapital ac-
count. 2 92 A defensible case can also be made for the use of this kind of
287. See DAVID A. Moss, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILs: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE
RISK MANAGER 85-122 (2002).
288. See Brennan, supra note 268, at 2-3, 15 (analogizing asymmetric treatment of the
return to a risky asset as equivalent to the payoff profile associated with an option written
on the asset, with carryover of pricing models based on the cost of synthetic replication of
the option equal to the tax on the underlying asset).
289. But see Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxation of Corporate In-
come, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 280-81 (2003) (arguing that deadweight loss attribu-
table to the classical corporate income tax can be offset by the provision of full loss offset
with respect to portfolio equity).
290. See generally Moss, supra note 287.
291. The necessary balance between the price revelation and liquidity functions, on the
one hand, and constraint of excessive risk taking, on the other hand, is similar to much the
same balance emphasized in the literature on financial transaction taxes. See, e.g.,
Mattheson, supra note 17.
292. To the extent that traded shares are subject to a lower tax rate approximating the
dividend tax rate, losses on such shares could be quarantined against gains. Noncapital
losses associated with the proprietary trading operations of a financial institution could be
quarantined against gains from those operations where such operations are permitted for
regulatory purposes. See, e.g., TURNER REVIEW, supra note 79, at 93-96 (criticizing the
case for a prohibition on proprietary trading by banks with access to retail deposit insur-
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broad limitation as an alternative to comprehensive marking-to-market
as a response to the problem of selective realization. For the most part,
existing legislative regimes do not rely on marking-to-market as the prin-
cipal response to selective realization; nor do they reflect a well-targeted
approach based on liquidity as a proxy for instruments that can be strate-
gically traded because of low transaction costs. 2 9 3 A rule limiting the de-
duction of risk-based losses against risk-based gains on financial
instruments is seen in some of the tax-policy literature as a means to ad-
dress the problem of selective realization, albeit at the expense of a po-
tentially adverse impact on risk taking attributable to asymmetric
recognition rates. 2 9 4 However, as a policy instrument intended to moder-
ate risk taking in deep and liquid markets for financial instruments, any
form of broad loss limitation rule would remain binding even if compre-
hensive mark-to-market reporting were applied to such instruments as a
response to the problem of selective realization.295
An important exception from a tighter noncapital loss limitation ap-
plied to financial instruments as the functional equivalent of a corrective
tax on risk taking can be made for those instruments that are used to
hedge positions in nonfinancial assets.296 Taxing a hedge with reference
to an underlying position ensures matching of both character and timing
of gain and loss on the offsetting positions. By maintaining symmetry of
effective tax rates, adverse pricing effects that might otherwise inhibit ef-
ance and lender-of-last resort facilities). But see Adair Turner, Chairman, Fin. Servs.
Auth., What Banks Do, What Should They Do and What Public Policies Are Needed to
Ensure Best Results for the Real Economy?, Speech at CASS Business School (Mar. 17,
2010), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/at-17marl0.pdf (arguing that mar-
ket liquidity is beneficial only to a point, and capital requirements should be used to limit
the extent of proprietary trading by commercial banks). Hedge funds organized in part-
nership form would not be able to flow through such losses to be recognized by partners
against other income. Because tax exempts are unaffected by loss limitations, it may be
necessary to use investment allocation rules to moderate the destabilizing effects of trading
strategies.
293. See EDGAR, supra note 251, at 228-39.
294. See, e.g., Robert H. Scarborough, Risk, Diversification and the Design of Loss Lim-
itations Under a Realization-Based Income Tax, 48 TAx L. REV. 677, 692-700, 707-16
(1993) (discussing various types of deductibility restrictions and their possible effects); see
also KREVER & BROOKs, supra note 247, at 117-22 (discussing the role and design of
capital loss limitations generally). A broad loss limitation might also eliminate any carry
back provision as a tax incentive to sell financial assets with accrued losses in a debt defla-
tionary environment. See, e.g., Slemrod, supra note 5, at 391 (explaining the "lock out"
effect: the inducement to sell assets with accrued losses to offset against previously realized
gains).
295. Mark-to-market reporting is applied to traders or dealers largely because they do
not face the same kind of liquidity constraint as other taxpayers, which is the standard
argument for application for realization-based recognition. See Edward D. Kleinbard &
Thomas L. Evans, The Role of Mark-to-Market Accounting in a Realization-Based Tax Sys-
tem, 75 TAXES 788, 799-800 (1997) (characterizing the application of mark-to-market re-
porting to the inventory of dealers as a substitute for a hedge-accounting regime).
296. The same exception could be extended to hedges of shares taxed at a lower rate
consistent with the tax rate on dividends as a means to reinforce a retention bias and
promote maintenance of margins of safety. See supra notes 247-54 and accompanying text.
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ficient hedging strategies are avoided.297 In effect, because they are risk-
reducing transactions, hedge transactions can be excluded from a tighter
loss limitation rule as a means to reinforce the dampening effect provided
by maintenance of margins of safety.298
Another possible exception would provide some form of targeted loss
refundability as a means to allow financially-distressed corporations to
restructure. 299 As one possible example, Canada allows financially-dis-
tressed corporations to use accumulated tax losses to lower their after-tax
cost of financing by replacing outstanding debt held by arm's-length cred-
itors with preferred shares ("distress preferred shares") paying tax-shel-
tered dividends. 300 Nonetheless, the rationale for this tax expenditure
program, as well as the specifics of its targeting, is problematic. Perhaps
most importantly, no attempt is made to limit the program to those cor-
porations whose failure would entail systemic risk. The broader availabil-
ity of the program suggests that it can be supported more defensibly as a
means to alleviate "congestion externalities" otherwise associated with
the mass layoff of employees upon the failure of a business.301 Although
it has not been the subject of any empirical inquiry, any impact on risk
taking from the relaxation of the binding nature of loss limitations in
these limited circumstances may be weak.30 2
B. RESTRICTIONS ON THE DEDUCTION OF INTEREST EXPENSE
UNDER THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX AS A FORM OF
Loss LIMITATION
Because the immediate cause of the credit crisis was a price collapse in
the U.S. housing market, it is understandable that the status of the home
mortgage interest deduction in that country has attracted attention.
When it comes to the personal income tax, it is unsurprising, therefore,
that the tax-policy literature highlights tax preferences for housing, in-
297. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 284, at 1914-15 (arguing that a hedge-accounting re-
gime is defensible because of the maintenance of symmetry of gain and loss recognition
rates for offsetting positions).
298. The need for such an exception has not been the subject of any systematic empiri-
cal study in the context of income tax systems that give rise to the worst character and
timing mismatches. The conventional view in the finance literature holds that hedging can
increase the value of a firm by, in part, reducing taxes through the "smoothing" of taxable
income. See generally John R. Graham & Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Tax Incentives to Hedge,
54 J. FIN. 2241(1999) (exploring the extent to which firms facing convex tax functions
hedge to reduce the volatility of taxable income). But see John R. Graham & Daniel A.
Rogers, Do Firms Hedge in Response to Tax Incentives?, 57 J. FIN. 815, 819 (2002) (finding
that firms hedge to increase debt capacity and its associated tax benefit).
299. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 14, at 1295-96 (recommending "loosen[ing] [of] re-
strictions on the use of losses by buyers of financial institutions and other companies 'too
big to fail,"' as well as relaxation of tax rules on cancellation of indebtedness).
300. See Tim Edgar, Distress Preferred Shares and Small Business Development Bonds:
A Tax Expenditure Analysis, 42 CAN. TAx J. 659, 678-80 (1994).
301. Id. at 688.
302. See IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 29 (suggesting that addressing a
debt tax bias attributable to the corporate interest deduction would limit the risks of easing
restrictions on the use of tax losses, which may be particularly defensible in the case of
bank failure).
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cluding the deductibility of home mortgage interest (or other form of
home mortgage tax relief such as a tax credit).3 03 Once the housing mar-
ket recovers, the IMF paper suggests, for example, that countries with
such relief consider phasing it out in the absence of the taxation of im-
puted rental income associated with home ownership.304 The apparent
basis for this recommendation is the perceived need to eliminate a tax
bias in favor of household leverage as a source of financial instability in
this particular asset market.305
It seems reasonably clear, contrary to the IMF paper's recommenda-
tion, that the housing price bubble was fueled primarily by innovative
mortgage lending techniques which met an otherwise unsatisfied de-
mand.306 To a limited extent, the home mortgage interest deduction may
have played a secondary role in lowering the after-tax cost of financing
and feeding this demand, 307 which was met with supply from both domes-
tic and foreign savings through the originate and distribute securitization
model. Given this likely limited role of the home mortgage interest de-
duction, it is surprising that consideration of the relationship between tax
policy and financial instability does not go further and discuss restrictions
on the deduction of investment interest expense under the personal in-
come tax as a particular form of loss limitation which can similarly con-
strain excessive risk taking associated with excessive household leverage.
This Part broadens the focus on the relationship between tax policy and
financial instability to consider the policy case for comprehensive restric-
tions on the deductibility of interest expense generally under the personal
income tax.
As reflected in standard country practice, the case for nondeductibility
of home mortgage interest expense is strong where the return from this
dual-purpose asset is commonly tax-preferred in the form of the exemp-
tion of realized gain and the nontaxation of imputed rental income. 308 In
the presence of these tax preferences for this particular asset, the per-
sonal consumption element can be taken as dominant and the associated
interest expense denied deductibility like any other personal consump-
tion expense. In this respect, tax policymakers in many countries have
concluded that any spillover benefits associated with home ownership do
not warrant the provision of an additional subsidy in the form of home
mortgage interest relief.309 The contentious issue is, instead, the need for
303. IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 17-25.
304. Id. at 24.
305. Id. at 18.
306. See Slemrod, supra note 5, at 390; see also Hemmelgarn & Nicodeme, supra note 5,
at 25 ("[T]ax incentives may have played a role in the development of the housing bubble
but the size of this role is difficult to assess, although the odds are that this role has been
secondary to monetary policy and credit markets developments.").
307. The taxable income profiles of borrowers in the subprime mortgage market means
that the value of the tax shield from the home mortgage interest deduction is minimal to
nonexistent.
308. See IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 5, at 18.
309. See id. at 20-21 (noting variety in effective average tax rates among countries).
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restrictions on the deduction of investment interest expense as a particu-
larized form of loss limitation applicable to expected loss in the form of
interest expense rather than unexpected loss attributable to the resolu-
tion of a bet element in a financial instrument.310 In fact, the conven-
tional framing of the policy case for investment interest restrictions is not
unlike that for loss limitations generally. Moreover, when the case is re-
framed as an attempt to impose a corrective tax on excessive leverage,
the parameters of investment interest expense restrictions are similar to
those of the loss limitation rule for financial instruments suggested in the
immediately preceding Part V.A.
Interest expense limitations under the personal income tax are conven-
tionally justified in the tax-policy literature as a means to limit the distri-
butional and efficiency effects otherwise associated with income
mismeasurement. 311 They target the windfall gains otherwise available
from an accrual-based interest expense deduction on borrowed funds
used to acquire an asset that generates tax-preferred revenue or gain at-
tributable to either tax-expenditure provisions or structural timing rules.
As with loss limitations generally, the strongest case for the application of
interest deductibility limitations is provided by straddle transactions,
which combine offsetting expected cash flows and are entered into to de-
rive a tax benefit from the inconsistent tax treatment of the short (bor-
rowing) and long (asset acquisition) sides of the transaction. 312 As
instances of tax avoidance, these transactions are devoid of any desirable
consequential attributes. By restoring consistency of tax treatment of loss
and gain associated with the short and long sides of straddle transactions,
restrictions on the deduction of interest expense eliminate the tax benefit
which is the only reason to enter into such transactions. The necessary
assessment of the consequential attributes of an unrestricted interest ex-
pense deduction are much more problematic, however, when the focus
shifts from straddle transactions to nonstraddle transactions-transac-
tions that are, in part, equity financed such that the expected cash flows
on a long asset acquisition exceed the expected cash flows on an associ-
ated short borrowing.
310. See Tim Edgar, Interest Deductibility Restrictions-Expecting Too Much from
REOP?, 52 CAN. TAX. J. 1130, 1140-46 (2004).
311. See Calvin H. Johnson, Why Have Anti-Tax Shelter Legislation? A Response to
Professor Zelenak, 67 TEX. L. REV. 591, 598-603 (1989); Calvin H. Johnson, Is an Interest
Deduction Inevitable?, 6 VA. TAX REV. 123, 124-26 (1986); Stanley A. Koppelman, Tax
Arbitrage and the Interest Deduction, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1154-59 (1988); Jerome
Kurtz, The Interest Deduction Under Our Hybrid Tax System: Muddling Toward Accommo-
dation, 50 TAx L. REV. 153, 156-57 (1995); Michael J. McIntyre, Tracing Rules and the
Deduction for Interest Payments: A Justification for Tracing and a Critique of Recent U.S.
Tracing Rules, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 67, 109-12 (1992); Michael J. McIntyre, An Inquiry into
the Special Status of Interest Payments, 1981 DUKE L.J. 765, 793-98 (1981); Cecily W. Rock
& Daniel N. Shaviro, Passive Losses and the Improvement of Net Income Measurement, 7
VA. TAX REV. 1, 25 (1987); Theodore Sims, Debt, Accelerated Depreciation, and the Tale of
a Teakettle: Tax Shelter Abuse Reconsidered, 42 UCLA L. REV. 263, 371 (1994); Lawrence
Zelenak, When Good Preferences Go Bad: A Critical Analysis of the Anti-Tax Shelter Pro-
visions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 67 TEX. L. REV. 499, 518-19 (1989).
312. Edgar, supra note 310, at 1140-46.
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Ignoring legislative design features for the moment, those who are
skeptical about the policy case for broadly-based restrictions on the de-
duction of interest expense under the personal income tax tend to charac-
terize such restrictions as just one specific type of limitation on the
recognition of losses.313 In other words, they highlight a negative conse-
quential attribute of broadly-based restrictions on the interest expense
deduction that is, in fact, seen to be characteristic of loss limitations gen-
erally: by reducing the tax rate on unexpected losses and thereby increas-
ing the after-tax amount of those losses, a broadly-based loss limitation
increases the variance of the after-tax returns on a wide range of affected
assets, which can deter investment in those assets. 3 14 In this respect,
there is nothing particularly unique about broadly-based restrictions on
the deduction of interest expense. Where a taxpayer borrows funds to
acquire an income-earning asset, unexpected loss is realized when the ex-
pected cash flows associated with the long asset acquisition do not materi-
alize. Because the unexpected loss is attributable, in part, to interest
expense on the short borrowing, a restriction on the deduction of the in-
terest expense can result in an increase of the after-tax amount of the
unexpected loss, with a negative impact on risk taking following from the
increased variance in after-tax returns that the deductibility restriction
causes. Protection of the revenue base, as well as maintenance of an ac-
ceptable income distribution and limitation of the cost of tax-expenditure
provisions, is thus seen to come at the cost of a potentially adverse impact
on risk taking.
Where the target of interest expense restrictions is a range of nonstrad-
dle transactions with consequential attributes that are nonetheless seen to
warrant a response, some form of passive loss limitations315 is the obvious
target-effective response. This type of legislative regime relies on the
identification of particular income sources (for example, investment in-
come and passively-earned business income) as the core targeting fea-
ture. The character of the identified income sources is effectively used as
a proxy for the consequential attributes that presumably justify applica-
tion of the interest deductibility restrictions to straddle transactions and a
range of nonstraddle transactions. But if the rationale for interest de-
ductibility restrictions under the personal income tax is reframed as a cor-
rective tax on excessive risk-taking associated with excessive leverage, the
case for some form of passive loss limitations arguably becomes that
much stronger. Similar to loss limitations generally, the strongest case for
the application of such limitations as a restriction on the deduction of
interest expense is in the context of asset acquisitions in deep and liquid
markets where diversification of risk is readily available and scaling of
313. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Case Against Passive Investments: A Critical Ap-
praisal of the Passive Loss Restrictions, 42 STAN. L. REV. 15, 24-40 (1989); Leandra Leder-
man, The Entrepreneurship Effect: An Accidental Externality in the Federal Incone Tax, 65
OHIO ST. L.J. 1401, 1427-35 (2004).
314. See Bankman, supra note 313, at 24-40.
315. I.R.C. § 469 (2006).
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any bet is possible at low transaction costs. 3 16 Interest deductibility re-
strictions as a particularized form of loss limitation ensure that the gov-
ernment does not act as an insurer and collects tax on risk-taking; they
also may suppress excessive leverage characteristic of speculative and
Ponzi finance states and promote maintenance of margins of safety. In-
deed, interest deductibility restrictions can support regulatory limitations
on leverage, such as margin requirements and minimum levels of equity
for mortgage eligibility.
A focus on the type of income source may also be a much better proxy
for the application of restrictions as a corrective tax on excessive lever-
age. In particular, passive sources of income tend to be closely associated
with financial assets acquired in deep and liquid markets, which are the
most susceptible to excessive risk taking. An exception for income
earned in an active business can serve as a proxy for an inability to diver-
sify, in which case the potentially adverse effects of interest deductibility
restrictions on risk taking are most compelling, and the government
should act as a risk bearer. Indeed, even with an unrestricted interest
expense deduction in this particular context, full loss refundability is un-
dermined by noncapital loss limitations, which may or may not strike an
appropriate balance between the need for a constraint on excessive risk
taking associated with an unrestricted interest expense deduction and any
adverse impact on risk taking that deductibility restrictions might entail.
The same balance need not be struck, however, with investment in the
housing market. Although there is not the same ability to diversity risk
as there is with deep and liquid markets for financial assets, real estate
speculation should be ineligible for an active business exception and
thereby subject to interest deductibility restrictions. As the credit crisis
illustrates all too painfully, investment in this market is especially suscep-
tible to speculative and Ponzi financing.317
316. See, e.g., JIM STANFORD, PAPER Boom: WHY REAL PROSPERITY REQUIRES A NEW
APPROACH TO CANADA'S EcoNoMY 316 (1999) (suggesting that the deduction of interest
expense associated with leveraged share acquisitions should be denied because of the dis-
tributional consequences of the deduction and the inefficiencies that follow from the exces-
sive trading of shares that is induced, in part, by the deduction); see also TAx REVIEW
PANEL, supra note 279, at 70, 73 (recommending recognition of only 60% of interest ex-
pense on indebtedness linked to the acquisition of shares of listed corporations).
317. See AusTL. Gov'T PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, FIRST HOME OWNERSHIP 75-121
(2004) (suggesting that price pressure in the housing sector in Australia has been caused, in
part, by the combination of a preferential capital gains tax rate and an unrestricted interest
expense deduction on borrowed funds used to acquire rental property); see also Gavin A.
Wood & Yong Tu, Are There Investor Clienteles in Rental Housing?, 32 REAL EST. ECON.
413, 415 (2004) (finding "that marginal tax rates affect the gross and net rental yields of
investors' rental property portfolios"); TAx REVIEW PANEL, supra note 279, at 70, 73 (rec-
ommending application of a 40% discount for the recognition of rental revenue, capital
gains, and associated interest expense as a means to mute the incentives for households to
leverage the acquisition of rental real estate); Turner, supra note 292, at 17-19 (arguing
that macro-prudential regulatory tools should be designed differently for real estate
finance).
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VI. CONCLUSION
A focus on moderation of financial instability as a public policy goal
requires a comprehensive reexamination of regulatory regimes which are
necessarily limited in their application to the supply side of capital mar-
kets. Consistent with an emerging literature, this article has suggested
some directions in which tax policy can play an important secondary role,
particularly on the demand side of capital markets where the effect of
regulatory regimes focused on the supply side is indirect. More particu-
larly, tax constraints on leverage, both corporate and household, can
moderate the "animal spirits"318 that drive capital markets to extremes of
optimism. Given various practical policy constraints that necessitate in-
complete consistency of the taxation of returns to corporate debt and eq-
uity, the article emphasizes how certain of the features of dividend
imputation systems can promote maintenance of margins of safety, pri-
marily through a tax bias in favor of the retention of earnings for a range
of taxable investors. This bias should be supported, however, by adop-
tion of comprehensive thin capitalization rules intended to constrain the
appetite for corporate leverage of tax-exempt and nonresident investors.
Limits on the deductibility of interest expense under the personal income
tax targeted to investment in the housing market, as well as publicly-
traded financial assets, can similarly be justified as necessary tax con-
straints. In addition, tighter limitations on the recognition of unexpected
losses on financial instruments generally, along with full taxation of unex-
pected gains, can be framed as the equivalent of a tax intended to correct
excessive risk taking in the face of its mismeasurement. But given the
empirical ambiguity of their effectiveness, such limitations can be sup-
ported, alternatively, as a constraint on the extent of the provision of
public insurance.
318. See generally AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 55.
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